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This study examines how U.S. state legislative staffs conduct evaluations. The
study addresses the ubiquity of state legislative program evaluation (LPE) units, the
standards those units follow, the recommendations that LPE reports proffer, and the
quality of the reports on several criteria. The study also addresses the feasibility of
using metaevaluation to evaluate a large number of reports using solely the
information contained in the reports.
The study uses metaevaluation criteria developed by combining aspects of,
primarily, the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) for
performance audits, the Joint Committee's Program Evaluation Standards (PES), and,
secondarily, Scriven's Key Evaluation Checklist. In the process of developing the
metaevaluation criteria the GAGAS and the PES are closely compared. The criteria
were applied to a random sample of 100 of the 1,911 LPE reports published by state
LPE units from 2001 through 2005.
The study finds that state LPE units, and consequently the reports they
produce, are overwhelmingly more connected to performance auditing and the
GAGAS than to evaluation and evaluation standards. The metaevaluation criterion on
which the LPE reports varied most was the comparisons criterion. Roughly a third of

all LPE reports were graded excellent or good, another third fair, and the final third
poor—reflecting no mention of comparisons in the report. Evaluations were more
likely to be graded excellent or good on this criterion than were performance audits.
This study also seeks to test a methodological model—that of using
metaevaluation to examine a large number of reports. The results from this attempt
are mixed. Using metaevaluation in this way can determine the specific areas where
evaluation reports are excelling or failing. However, accurately and fairly evaluating
reports solely from the report itself presents some major problems. Among these
problems are the inability to check both the accuracy of most data collected and the
propriety of techniques used to collect data from human subjects. Nevertheless, we
can formulate important conclusions including how well LPE reports use comparative
studies when reaching their conclusions, how focused the reports are on goals and
objectives, and how closely the reports follow established professional standards.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The main policy-making bodies for state governments in the United States are the
respective state legislatures. In the U.S. federal system the states are called on to enact
and carry out a myriad of policies and programs from education to health to worker
safety. How state legislatures conduct evaluation in both their policy-making and
oversight roles would seem a crucial aspect of evaluation work. Evaluation likely
influences how states determine policy choices, enact policies from among those choices
and decide on the value of those choices once enacted. However, very little has been
written about how state legislative staffs conduct evaluations.
There is a body of evaluation literature surrounding national-level evaluation
agencies, Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs), around the world (see Gunvaldsen &
Karlsen, 1999; Leeuw, 1992; Ling, 2003; Pollitt & Summa, 1996). At the level of U.S.
states the published, academic literature concentrates on format, process, and scope rather
than the products—the reports—of the state legislative program evaluation (LPE) units.
This study concentrates on state legislative program evaluation units. While much
evaluation work concentrates on the executive or administrative side of evaluation use,
comparatively little is written about the evaluations state legislatures commission from
their own staffs. Since legislatures are the predominate policy-making and funding
bodies, the direction they set on evaluation is extremely important.
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The study seeks to contribute to the knowledge of how evaluation is conducted by
an important U.S. governmental sector, state legislatures, on a wide range of issues
(education, transportation, safety, etc.). It also aims to show how metaevaluation can be
used to assess a large number of evaluation reports in a setting, field or topic.
Henry and Mark (2003) discuss the relative dearth of research concerning
evaluation itself. They contrast this with the rather extensive literature concerning
evaluation findings—what programs work and what do not. They write that not much is
known by evaluators about "how many evaluations were completed last year, how much
money was spent on evaluation, who did the evaluations, and how they were conducted."
(p. 69) There is a "serious shortage of rigorous, systematic evidence that can guide
evaluation or that evaluators can use for self-reflection or for improving their next
evaluation." (p. 69) Henry and Mark note the following:
Prescriptive advice and admonitions about how to do evaluation have been
plentiful, filling books, journals, conferences, e-mails, and conversations.
But these are generally based on personal experience, observation, and the
individual's sometimes idiosyncratic beliefs and values—and not on
carefully gathered evidence that can be described, shared, and critiqued,
(p. 70)

This statement applies directly to the legislative program evaluation literature as
well as the general evaluation literature.
After reviewing the state of the evaluation literature, Henry and Mark suggest six
different areas that are ripe for research on evaluation. Among these six is
metaevaluation. They write that metaevaluation research "can be informative about the
nature of evaluation practice in specific cases" and that "the greatest benefit of
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metaevaluations to the field will come from syntheses across multiple metaevaluations,"
(p. 74)
This study incorporates the metaevaluation item. A base of knowledge about what
is currently happening in the legislative program evaluation area is important to inform
any future research. The study contributes to the practice of evaluation in two ways. First,
the study furthers the knowledge of how evaluation is conducted by the main U.S.
governmental sector on a wide range of issues (education, transportation, safety, etc.).
Second, this study contributes to the literature concerning metaevaluation—specifically
the feasibility of conducting metaevaluations using solely the evaluation report. It
contributes to the theory of evaluation by showing how evaluation works in combination
with (and sometimes within) other fields: legislative governance and auditing.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This review of current literature surrounding state legislative program evaluation
(LPE) will be divided into five sections. First, a section on terminology will examine the
various terms and descriptions used to explain what state legislatures do to evaluate
programs, policies and organizations. Many different terms have been used with some
general areas of agreement appearing over time. However, there are still many activities
that appear to be the same yet are designated by different terms. Second, a look at the
literature regarding the separate fields of auditing and evaluation, how they have come
together in many instances, and how certain types of auditing (performance auditing,
program auditing, economy and efficiency auditing) are strikingly similar to evaluation.
Third, a brief look at the literature addressing auditing at the national government level.
This literature is addressed to help inform the examination of LPE at the state level.
Fourth, an analysis of the literature specifically addressing LPE in state legislatures.
Themes in this section include the growth of LPE in the states, different types of
configurations for LPE offices/organizations, how LPE can best ensure use of their
findings, and future prospects for LPE in the states. The fifth and final section will
examine the literature from the methodological perspective. Authors collected original
data through three main methods: surveys of LPE units and other interested stakeholders,
case studies of LPE in various organizations, and a direct examination of the product of
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LPE in the states—the evaluation reports themselves. It is this third method—the one that
will be employed in this study—that has barely been utilized at the state level.
Broadly, the literature in three of the five areas is much more descriptive than
analytical. The literature in the first section mainly describes the current typology
surrounding performance auditing and legislative program evaluation. Similarly, the
literature concerning the separate fields of auditing and evaluation describes differences
from a theoretical level. The literature specifically addressing LPE in state legislatures is
also generally descriptive—addressing topics such as the educational background of state
LPE staff members, the activities undertaken by LPE units, and other descriptive issues.
The two areas that show a slightly more analytic bent address auditing at the
national government level and the methodological strategies employed in some of the
literature. The national level auditing literature offers a glimpse of what the state LPE
literature could become, given more attention by scholars. The fifth area examined—the
methodological perspective—shows surveys and case studies generally employed for
descriptive rather than analytical purposes.
After reviewing the LPE literature, attention focuses on the literature concerning
metaevaluation. This includes a discussion of the published literature that uses
metaevaluation across multiple evaluations (focusing on the content area, the standards
used, and the number of evaluations included) and the body of literature addressing the
theoretical aspects of metaevaluation. This literature addresses questions such as how to
conduct a metaevaluation and when metaevaluation is needed.
The metaevaluation literature is helpful because it shows the different ways
metaevaluation is used to examine evaluations. This literature informs subsequent
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metaevaluative studies much more than descriptions of state LPE units inform subsequent
studies of that subject.

Terminology

The activities undertaken by state LPE units share many similarities yet are
designated by many different terms. This study adopts the term "legislative program
evaluation" to refer to the variety of evaluative activities carried out by these units. LPE
is the term used by the National Conference of State Legislatures' staff section, the
largest membership group of these organizations. Though many states uses terms such as
performance audit and program audit to describe these practices and offices, the
evaluative aspect is present in the work performed. The discussion below follows the
literature chronologically to explore the emergence and disappearance of different terms.
Knighton (1967), being one of the earliest attempts to look at performance auditing
in state legislatures, is a logical place to start in an examination of the terminology used
to describe this issue. Knighton adopted the term performance post audit, which he
defined as
. . . an independent examination, conducted by the Auditor General, for
the purpose of providing the legislature with an evaluation and report of
the manner in which administrators of the agencies and departments of the
state have discharged their responsibilities to faithfully, efficiently, and
effectively administer the programs of the state. Faithfulness refers to
whether or not programs have been administered in accordance with

promises made to the legislature and the expressions of legislative will.
Effectiveness refers to whether or not planned program objectives have
been achieved. Efficiency refers to whether or not program
accomplishment has been achieved by using the least cost combination of
resources and with a minimum of waste, (p. 1)
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He sets out three criteria that are echoed in descriptions of legislative program evaluation
to come: faithfulness, efficiency and effectiveness. He uses the term evaluation to
describe what auditors do for the legislature. While Knighton does broach the topic of
evaluating legislative goals, through his faithfulness criterion, conspicuously absent is
any mention of examining non-goal related outcomes, or side-effects. This is a key aspect
of evaluation (Scriven, 2006) but one that is often, though not always, overlooked in
discussions of LPE.
One of the earliest uses of the term legislative program evaluation is by Chadwin
(1974). He cites different names that various agencies, offices, and units in the states use
to describe LPE activities—program auditing, program review, performance postauditing, legislative oversight, and effectiveness auditing. He concludes that while there
is different terminology, and some degree of different approaches employed, the
objective of each LPE unit is to "determine the effectiveness—the results—of public
programs" (p. 1). The heart of Chadwin's definition is the concept of program evaluation
which, in the state legislative context, differs from traditional staff oversight work in that
it 1) is concerned with programs and therefore cuts across organizational structures,
government departments, and agencies, 2) it "emphasizes output and impact as well as
input and process" (p. 1), and 3) it entails much more intensive data collection and
analysis than traditional legislative staff work. Chadwin's use of the term that has come
to be accepted in the field—legislative program evaluation—and his differentiation
between LPE and traditional legislative oversight was an important early advance in
identifying and establishing LPE.
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Writing the same year as Chadwin, Brown and Pethel (1974) address many of the
same, or similar, terms but in greater depth. They adopt the term program evaluation,
stating that "as an institutional commitment of state legislatures [it] is a recent
phenomenon" (p. 318). They then use the term legislative evaluation, writing that it is "a
departure from the traditional concern of public administration with the executive and, as
such, needs explanation, description, and differentiation from other forms of evaluation"
(p. 318). They contend that the "legislative role in evaluation is not sufficiently well
developed for us to speak in terms of generally accepted procedures, methods or style"
(p. 318). They employ a variety of terms—legislative post-audit, performance audit, and
legislative performance audit—interchangeably and contend these terms are becoming
generally accepted with a majority of state legislatures devoting a legislative agency or
unit to these tasks. They show the close linkage between auditing and evaluation by
describing legislative performance audits as producing evaluation reports. They also
interchangeably use the terms legislative evaluation organization and state legislative
audit groups to describe the various state legislative agencies and units that perform these
activities. Throughout this study the term LPE unit is used.
Brown and Pethel contend that working definitions in the post-audit field are
emerging for performance audits and management audits. A performance audit is "an
evaluation of the effectiveness of governmental operations, programs, and organizations
to determine accomplishment of goals and objectives" (p. 319). A management audit is
defined as "an evaluation of the efficiency of governmental operations, programs, and
organizations with special attention to administrative policies and practices" (p. 319).
While these definitions are emerging, state TPE units do not agree on specific definitions.
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While touching on many of Chadwin's points, Brown and Pethel continually conflate
different terms. This lessens their influence in defining distinctions between LPE and
other activities.
In another mixture of auditing and evaluation Brown (1976) uses the term
program evaluation audits. He believed there was, and would continue to be, a blurring
between the activities of auditors and those of evaluators. He cited state-level auditors
being asked frequently by legislators if they could take on more program evaluation
work. Since many states, at this time, had financial audit units available it seemed easy to
add more responsibilities to these existing units, rather than create a new, separate,
evaluation unit. However, he cautioned that such an approach would produce "a hybrid
which is unsatisfactory from all points of view" as the new program evaluation work
would leave less time for the important financial audit work to which legislators had
become accustomed. Brown's main contribution is identifying the slow expansion of
auditors' duties to include program evaluation. A more quantitative examination of this
trend, through either a survey or an examination of reports issued by state-level auditors,
would have added value to his contribution.
Writing a few years later Brown (1979) changes slightly from his previous term
and adopts audit-evaluation to describe "at a minimum, program or performance auditing
and program evaluation" (p. VIII). He points out that states with offices designated post
audit usually use the term program auditing while those state offices with different
designations use the term program evaluation. He points out that another, slightly less
commonly used, term is program review. Though this term is not as common, it is the
one he uses in the title of this book—The Effectiveness of Legislative Program Review.
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As with his earlier work, this book would have benefited from a more rigorous
examination of the various state audit offices.
Craft (1979) also uses the term audit-evaluation when referring state legislative
oversight work. He defines legislative oversight very narrowly to mean "published
reports written by State legislative staffs whose primary focus is to evaluate the
efficiency and/or effectiveness of government programs" (p. 22). Again, the terms audit
and evaluation are combined.
Jones (1987) discusses state legislative activities that are variously called program
evaluation, performance auditing, program review, and sunset. These all have a
"common mission: to review, analyze and asses how state agencies and programs have
been working" (p. 20). He refers to the state legislative organizations as evaluation units
and program evaluation units. The term sunset here refers to a reform instituted in the
states in the 1970s where the legislative authorization of programs and agencies was
granted with a sunset, or expiration, date after which the program or agency would either
need to be re-authorized by the legislature or terminated (see Adams & Sherman, 1978).
Greathouse and Funkhouser (1988) cite Knighton (1967) as the basis for their
definition of performance auditing: "an independent examination for the purpose of
reporting on the extent to which a state agency is faithfully, efficiently, and effectively
carrying out the programs for which it is responsible" (p. 57). The authors believe that
performance auditing is not program evaluation. In their view program evaluation
. . . seems to be used primarily by academics in education and psychology
to describe an activity more related to scholarly research than to legislative
oversight. Program evaluation seems to denote an activity that is largely
sympathetic, nonjudgmental, and collaborative in relation to the entity
being evaluated, (p. 58)
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Conversely, performance auditing "produces sharper, more focused and more critical
conclusions on major issues than either program evaluation or other forms of
nonfmancial auditing" (p. 58). This is not a view of evaluation shared by many in the
evaluation field.
Davis (1990) makes comparisons between the two traditions of performance
auditing and evaluation research. Davis adopts the Generally Accepted Government
Auditing Standards (General Accounting Office) definition of performance auditing, a
technique that involves "a determination of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of
government organizations, programs, activities and functions, in addition to their
compliance with laws and regulations" (p. 35). He adopts the Rossi and Freeman (1985)
definition of evaluation research: "the systematic application of social [research]
procedures in assessing the conceptualization and design, implementation and utility of
social intervention programs" (p. 35). Davis is one of the few authors to adopt definitions
from authoritative sources, be they regulatory agencies or scholars from another field.
Sedgwick (1993), writing of the usage in Australian government, defines
performance auditing as "concerned with auditing qualitative and quantitative measures
in the public sector with the aim of improving program operational efficiency as well as
administrative effectiveness" (p. 148). It is also known as efficiency auditing. Sedgwick
contends evaluation addresses these same areas but can, and should, also focus on the
effectiveness and appropriateness of programs and the policies that frame them. This
additional focus of evaluation is what essentially differentiates it from performance
auditing. Sedgwick is one of the few authors to broach this issue of evaluation's mandate
to address program appropriateness.
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Brooks (1996) argues that a blended approach encompassing auditing and
evaluation has developed, largely in response to the needs of state legislators. Like Davis
(1990) he uses the GAO's definition of performance auditing. Though he notes that
program evaluation is much more difficult to define because it lacks the formal
organizational underpinnings, he also adopts the Rossi and Freeman (1995) definition of
evaluation.
Barzeley (1997) sees a struggle between those who would define performance
auditing more along the lines of traditional financial auditing and those who define it
more like evaluation (Chelimsky, 1996; Rist, 1989). Barzeley takes the view that
"performance audits are not a type of audit; they are evaluations" (p. 237). He points out
differences between performance auditing, evaluation and auditing and tries to show
performance auditing as a concept rather than just give a definition. He addresses how
European countries define performance audit and the activities that they consider
encompassing performance audits. This helpful venture beyond the borders of North
America is conspicuously absent in most of the other literature concerning performance
auditing.
Throughout the literature on terminology auditing and evaluation are often
combined and sometimes conflated. In general, both terms and their extensions (for
auditing these include performance auditing, program auditing and efficiency auditing,
for evaluation they include program evaluation, legislative program evaluation and
evaluation research) are defined as assessing the conduct, results and impacts of
government programs, policies and agencies. The ubiquity of the words evaluation and
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evaluate in definitions provided for performance and program auditing further illustrates
how closely related the fields of performance auditing and evaluation are.

Auditing and Evaluation Compared

There is a limited amount of literature addressing the similarities and differences
of auditing and evaluation. The papers in this area come almost equally from the
accounting/auditing side and the evaluation/public administration side. Beginning in the
1960s and 1970s public administrators and auditors began to link a number of
government performance improvement movements with the fields of auditing and
program evaluation. While some address a comparison of auditing as a whole to
evaluation, others concentrate on performance auditing and its relationship to evaluation.
Chelimsky (1985), writing in the journal Evaluation Review, provides the most
comprehensive and informative discussion of the origins, differences and similarities of
auditing and evaluation. Auditing developed, historically, "as a procedure for detailed
checking" (p. 485) concerned most with verification. Evaluation, conversely, is more
concerned with the "actual effects of government programs and policies" (p. 486). While
both auditing and program evaluation address normative questions descriptive questions
are routine in program evaluation but rare in auditing.
Davis (1990) makes comparisons between performance auditing, not auditing
more broadly, and evaluation research on the following four dimensions: variables
emphasized, independence, quality control, and professionalism. Performance auditors
emphasize "management control" more and program impacts less while evaluators do the
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opposite. Auditors are more concerned with legal and procedural compliance issues than
are evaluators.
Pollitt and Summa (1996) contend that there is an absence of empirical
investigation matching audits and evaluations to discover their similarities and
differences (though the authors point to such a project they are working on). They largely
draw on the literature about Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in Europe for their
perspectives on performance audits. They cite Chelimsky (1985) as the definitive paper
on the subject but point out that her focus was on traditional financial auditing, not
performance auditing. Most of their comments about evaluation units do not envision an
evaluation unit within a legislative body. For example, they contend that SAIs have more
authority to get their reports heard among legislators than do evaluators. This clearly
overlooks evaluators who work for legislative bodies.
Rist (1989) largely echoes Chelimsky (1985) on the differences between auditing
and evaluation. His main contribution is his discovery that 70 percent of employees at the
U.S. Congress' General Accounting Office (GAO, now called the Government
Accountability Office) are designated as evaluators while only a minority is classified as
accountants.
Newcomer (1994) surveyed United States federal government Inspectors General
and evaluation offices regarding their audit and evaluation activities. She reports that
both of these organizations focus on program process and implementation rather than on
impacts. Independence is more important to auditors than to evaluators. Evaluators are
much more likely to invite program staff to be on evaluation teams and more generally
involve them in the evaluation process. This use of a survey to discover the views of
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auditors and evaluators at the federal level in the United States is unique. Several survey
have been conducted at the state level (Botner, 1986; Mohan, 1997; NPLES, 2004;
Schwartz & Mayne, 2005; Stutzman & Rainey, 1981; VanLandingham, Kinton, Boerner,
& Zelio, 2000; Walton & Brown, 1990).
Sedgwick (1993) contends that performance auditing and evaluation address
similar questions but evaluation can, and should, also focus on the effectiveness and
appropriateness of programs and the policies that frame them. This additional focus of
evaluation is what essentially differentiates it from performance auditing. Other
differences between performance auditing and evaluation include: performance auditing
is more concerned with compliance and operational efficiency, performance auditors (in
Australia) do not question policy outcomes while evaluators do, evaluation relies on a
much broader base of data, and performance auditing relies on authoritative/official data
while evaluation collects additional data. The similarities between performance auditing
and evaluation include: both are fundamental parts of the accountability chain, both
contribute to better program management, both rely on objectivity, integrity and
professionalism, and both cover a diverse range of activities.
Brown (1976) contends that the presence of "single purpose legislative program
evaluation staffs in a number of states" (p. 85) has caused legislators to ask state auditors
about doing more performance work, program evaluation work and program audit work.
As discussed above in the terminology section, he uses the term program evaluation
audits because he believes there is, and will continue to be, a blurring between the
activities of auditors and those of evaluators. However, he believes a traditional audit
agency, unchanged, cannot perform program evaluation audits. His experience in the
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Kansas Legislative Division of Post Audit is that they have two divisions, one for
financial-compliance audits and one for program evaluation audits. Brown quotes Mark
Chadwin (from personal correspondence) as saying "program evaluators generally will
go further than auditors (1) to construct program objectives where statutory and
documentary sources are vague and (2) to question existing program objectives if their
research raises doubts about them" (p. 86).
The limited literature comparing auditing and evaluation does highlight the main
agreement on differences between the two fields. Auditing, even when confined to
performance auditing, is more concerned with process and adherence to legislative
directions and goals. In contrast, evaluation is more concerned with outcomes and
impacts. While evaluation is also sensitive to legislative goals it can often question the
goals themselves.

National Supreme Audit Institutions

At the national level, government performance auditing is carried out by Supreme
Audit Institutions (SAIs). The American SAI is the Government Accountability Office
(formerly the General Accounting Office). There is a voluminous literature about SAIs
and their traditional or financial auditing duties. The literature concerning their
performance auditing duties is less extensive (internationally, performance auditing is
often referred to as economy and efficiency auditing or value-for-money auditing). A
review of the SAI literature on performance auditing gives some links to how
performance auditing works at the state legislative level in the U.S.
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Roberts and Pollitt (1994) present a case study of a value-for-money (VFM) audit
completed by the British National Audit Office. The authors view the VFM as a step
beyond traditional auditing but still not a "full-blooded evaluation" (p. 527). One way in
which it falls short of a program evaluation is that VFMs in Britain are not permitted to
"question the appropriateness of government policy objectives themselves" (p. 545).
Roberts and Pollitt see three limitations of the VFMs: (1) reports rarely specify methods
for improvement; (2) scope of work is primarily financial; and (3) dependence on
parliament means they are constrained by time.
Barzeley (1997) offers a basic primer on how European countries define
performance auditing and the activities that they consider encompassing performance
audits. He argues that audit bodies charged with conducting performance audits face a
decision of whether to adopt a "machine-like or rule-governed" approach or a "more
particularistic style of ideal-typical professional bureaucracies" (p. 255). Most choose the
rule-governed approach in an attempt to maintain their legitimacy.
Two papers about SAOs (Walker, 1985, and Schwartz, 1999) examine the actual
reports of SAIs to determine what types of issues they are looking at and how effective
they are.
One of the most methodologically sound papers that concentrates on the
American SAI, the GAO, is Walker's (1985). Walker states that the GAO's program
evaluation efforts serve Congress by providing oversight of public policy, a bludgeon to
coax agencies into pursuing activities preferred by Congressmen, and a tool for electoral
activities. Methodologically, Walker reviewed a broad sample of reports from the GAO
(35 in their entirety and 100 summaries) and determined that the GAO reports encourage
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growth in the size and scope of the state. He reviewed financial, management and
program audits/evaluations. "Most members of Congress do not find that pursuing the
auditor's norms of economy and efficiency contribute to their quest for reelection, to
gaining influence in their chamber or their committee, or to achieving desired policy
outcomes" (p. 365).

Walker cites Fenno's (1974) classic work on congressmen in

committee as identifying these typical desires. Addressing the impacts of performance
audit and evaluation work by the GAO, Walker contends that GAO reports are a minor
claimant on the attention of public managers. Walker believes auditors' values
(essentially economy and efficiency) are inconsistent with democratic values in the
United States (redundancy, federalism, separated powers, and various other checks on
legislative and executive power). While the GAO can act as a watchdog and "stop people
from doing some bad things" (p. 365) it doesn't have the authority/power to force change.
Schwartz (1999) examined "effectiveness audits or evaluations" (p. 513)
conducted by SAIs in six different countries to see how they really address effectiveness
in light of the political difficulties of doing so. He found that "most state auditors have
not met the challenge non-politicized, professional and objective outcome evaluations in
place of agency-based evaluations which are perceived to be infected by political
interests" (p. 522). He helpfully broaches the political aspects of a state auditor's job in
his conclusion that the main reason for this is the auditors' desire to avoid the political
dangers inherent in questioning the effectiveness of programs.
Schwartz and Mayne (2005) look at how government organizations in different
countries evaluate their evaluation, performance auditing and performance reporting
information. They cite Schwartz (1999) as a previous report examining or metaevaluating
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audit reports. Their methodology is basically a survey of SAIs asking them what type of
quality assurance systems they have in place. Unfortunately, the authors did not look
directly at the quality of the work. The surveys show that political concerns are one factor
inhibiting quality assurance activities in this area.
Song (2003) addresses the supreme audit institutions in South Korea, the Board of
Audit and Inspection (BAI). He shows how they are moving from performance audits to
program evaluations. As the BAI sees it, performance audits concern "the extent to which
the expenditure and implied actions have minimized the inputs for stipulated outputs
(economy), or maximized the outputs from the inputs used (efficiency), or maximized the
desired products or impacts of programs (effectiveness)" (p. 9). Song contends that one
of the main things the BAI needs to do when moving towards more program evaluation is
to expand their training unit to include research and evaluation methods as well as
accounting and audit methods. Also, the BAI needs to recruit more staff with skills in
"data collection, statistical research and policy analysis" (p. 13). These may be sound
recommendations, but Song presents no evidence that current BAI staff lack these skills.

Legislative Program Evaluation and the States

The literature on legislative program evaluation began with Knighton in 1967.
The early seventies through the mid-1980s saw a fair amount of interest in the issue, as
the number of states performing legislative program evaluation grew. Since 2000 there
has been very little addressing LPE. Almost no literature looks directly at the products—
the reports themselves—of legislative program evaluation in American states. Instead
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much is written about the growth of LPE units and LPE activity in the states, how to
structure a legislative program evaluation unit, and what type of people work in this field.
Methodologically, many papers use surveys to address unit structure, growth and
activities, others use case studies about different audit/evaluation reports, and finally two
papers look directly at a sample of evaluation-audit reports.

Structure, Growth and Staffing

Knighton (1967) basically defined performance post audit. This was the first real
academic look into this at the state level. He focused on the state of Michigan and its
creation of an auditor general office. Knighton stresses the importance of seating the
auditor under the control of the legislature and discusses the various pros and cons when
this reform was adopted in the 1962 Michigan constitution.
Crane (1972) lists information such as budgets, staffing levels, and staff member
salaries for legislative services agencies in each state. Crane's work is cited in some
papers (Berry, Turcotte, & Latham, 2002; Studer, Spitz, & Burt, 1981) to show the
growth of legislative audit/evaluation offices in the states.
Brown and Pethel (1974) provide a breakdown of some early legislative
evaluation/performance audit units in state legislatures. They adopt the term legislative
performance auditing but fail to clearly define it and use it interchangeably with
legislative evaluation and evaluation research. Brown and Pethel conclude that "the
legislative role in evaluation is not sufficiently well developed for us to speak in terms of
generally accepted procedures, methods, or style. But, there is an inkling of evidence that

20

its precepts differ from standard public administration principles of evaluation research"
(p. 318).
Chadwin (1974) writes that in 1970 no state legislature had a full time staff
responsible for evaluation of program effectiveness. By 1974 over a dozen did
(committees, commissions or auditors offices). He cites different names for these
activities, such as: program auditing, program review, performance post-auditing,
legislative oversight, and effectiveness auditing. Chadwin list the following reasons for
the increase in legislative program evaluation offices: an increased workload for
legislatures, federal decentralization efforts, heightened executive-legislative tension,
citizen pressure, and the availability of trained personnel. Legislative program evaluation
units are usually organized in one of three ways: under the control of an independent
commission (or committee), as core legislative staff or an auxiliary unit to the core
legislative staff, under the control of a legislative auditor's office.
Brown (1976) contends that the presence of "single purpose legislative program
evaluation staffs in a number of states" (p. 85) has caused legislators to ask state auditors
about doing more performance work, program evaluation work and program audit work.
As discussed above in the terminology section, Brown uses the term program evaluation
audits because he believes there is, and will continue to be, a blurring between the
activities of auditors and those of evaluators. However, he believes a traditional audit
agency, unchanged, can perform program evaluation audits. His experience in the Kansas
Legislative Division of Post Audit is that they have two divisions, one for financialcompliance audits and one for program evaluation audits. Brown quotes Mark Chadwin
(from personal correspondence) as saying "program evaluators generally will go further
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than auditors (1) to construct program objectives where statutory and documentary
sources are vague and (2) to question existing program objectives if their research raises
doubts about them" (p. 86).
Craft (1979) points out that legislative auditor offices often have a program audit
division and a (much larger) financial audit division. Also some legislative fiscal staff
members and general legislative research staff members who serve standing committees
conduct performance audits. He offers a comprehensive view of the state of LPE in the
late 1970s. By the middle of 1978 the Legislative Program Evaluation Section
Clearinghouse at the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers had received 477 "state
legislative program and management audit-evaluations" (p. 23). Of these, 39 percent
were produced by legislative auditors, 35 percent produced by special purpose evaluation
staffs, 14 percent by fiscal offices, 9 percent by general research staffs, and 3 percent by
individual committee staffs (p. 23). Almost all of the oversight staffs report to joint
legislative committees or commissions while all the special purpose evaluation staffs
report to joint legislative committees. In 13 of the 17 states studied staff members must
receive formal approval of a topic from their oversight committee/commission before
starting an audit-evaluation. Recommendations in reports are sometimes revised by the
legislators on oversight committees/commissions before a report is released. A few states
do not provide recommendations in their reports. Several states produce annual reports to
the legislature that include follow up on recommendations from reports. While the
number of states with these types of organizations/staffs is increasing there are also many
instances of program audit/evaluation sections closing or ceasing program evaluation
activities. Audit-evaluation staffs do not like taking on the sunset review duties. They feel
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these are more routine/unimportant regulatory bodies and these duties take time from
their other responsibilities. "Extensive program and management audit-evaluation work
by the State legislative staffs is less than 5 years old in most States. The next decade will
see a considerable amount of turmoil before formal legislative oversight becomes a
normal, accepted practice" (p. 26).
Brown (1979) uses the term "audit-evaluation" to describe "at a minimum,
program or performance auditing and program evaluation" (p. VIII). He points out that
states with offices designated post audit usually use the term program auditing while
those in offices with different designations use the term program evaluation. Others use
program review. The development of these offices has followed five stages: 1)
recognition, 2) allocation of resources, 3) performance, 4) utilization, and 5) impact.
Most of Brown's book is devoted to case studies of legislative audit-evaluation reports
from various states. These case studies allow Brown to uncover interesting conclusions
about report implementation. Seven factors affect report implementation in these states:
1) whether a program or an agency was reviewed, 2) whether the legislature approved the
topics, 3) the legislature's level of interest or concern, 4) executive officials' attitudes
toward the reports, 5) the nature to the report findings and recommendations, 6) the
timing of the reports, 7) the media coverage generated by the reports.
Studer, Spitz, and Burt (1981) all served in the Minnesota Legislative Auditors
Office. They argue that legislative program evaluation can only be effective if: 1)
legislators and executive branch officials have reasonable expectations and 2) systematic
efforts are made to ensure results are used. They cite the New York Legislative
Commission on Expenditure Review as the first state legislative organization for
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oversight, created in 1969. Within five years of that more than 12 states had begun
related activities. At the time of their writing (1981) approximately 40 state legislatures
have the "capacity to conduct formal oversight or evaluation studies" (p. 168). LPE staff
must be concerned with getting the legislature to use their work in the budget-policy
process and getting the executive branch to use their work to implement program
changes. Three things that appear to enhance evaluation's usefulness are: 1) placement of
the evaluation unit, 2) choice of evaluation topics, 3) working within the legislative
process. The authors identify these as places where legislative program evaluation units
exist: within a traditional financial audit organization, within a fiscal bureau or
appropriations committee, within a legislative research unit, and within a standing
legislative committee. When choosing an evaluation topic, the authors argue that the
following criteria should be used: well-defined use, good policy relevance, a clear
program with an existing track record (not new), a stable program (not a lot of senior
staff turnover), cost effectiveness (would the cost of an evaluation be greater than the
benefits derived from the evaluation), appropriate timing (completed in time to inform
budget cycle, legislative session). The most insightful of these criteria is the issue of costeffectiveness. Unfortunately, no other authors address this issue of weighing an
evaluation's potential benefits against the cost of conducting the evaluation.
Green (1984) writes at a time when legislative performance auditing in Oregon
was limited to sunset reviews of some agencies, but when an interim study on expanded
program evaluation for the legislature was being conducted. He foresees problems if
legislative evaluations are conducted by fiscal committee (such as the ways and means
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committee or budget committee) staff because they do not have a broad enough view of
policy because they are mostly concerned with spending and taxation issues.
Jones (1987) reports that legislatures in more than 40 states have established some
type of mechanism to assess the performance of state agencies and programs. These
activities are variously called program evaluation, performance auditing, program review,
and sunset. Evaluation units were first established in legislatures in Hawai'i and New
York in the late 1960s and adopted by most other states in the 1970s. Nineteen
legislatures have created a program evaluation unit within an existing audit agency. 11
legislatures have created a separate program evaluation unit (e.g. NY Legislative
Commission on Expenditure Review), and 16 states have assigned program evaluation
duties to another legislative agency (in 10 part of a legislative fiscal agency, and in the
others part of a broader legislative service agency). Jones quotes Alan Rosenthal (p. 23)
as predicting legislatures will use these evaluation units for longer term analysis of policy
alternatives.
Greathouse and Funkhouser (1988) state that 33 states have formal audit or
evaluator functions, 13 of these are located in a legislative office. The states that call their
work program evaluation do not follow the generally accepted government auditing
standards (General Accounting Office). The authors see the GAGAS as workable for
financial auditing but not for nonfinancial auditing. They argue that the nonfinancial
audit and evaluation work being done in state audit organizations in accordance with the
GAGAS is called performance auditing. Greathouse and Funkhouser report that no state
audit or evaluation unit uses the terms economy and efficiency auditing or program
results auditing (though the GAO does use these terms). They criticize the GAO
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standards for conflating economy and efficiency and for not linking performance outputs
with the costs of obtaining them. The authors believe that performance auditing is not
program evaluation. In their view program evaluation "seems to be used primarily by
academics in education and psychology to describe an activity more related to scholarly
research than to legislative oversight. Program evaluation seems to denote an activity that
is largely sympathetic, nonjudgmental, and collaborative in relation to the entity being
evaluated" (p. 58). "Performance auditing produces sharper, more focused and more
critical conclusions on major issues than either program evaluation or other forms of
nonfinancial auditing" (p. 58). If these views of program evaluation were accurate at the
time, they are certainly not accurate today. They may reflect the authors' background in,
and preference for the terminology of, auditing.
Wheat (1991) says two-thirds of the states currently have "in-house units that
regularly produce audit reports that are quite different from traditional financial preaudits
and postaudits" (p. 386). He adopts the Greathouse and Funkhouser (1987) definition of
performance audit. Performance audit has emerged over the last 20 to 30 years due
largely to the emergence of performance budgeting, a changing political culture, an
increasingly complex legal environment, and organizational and staffing changes at
GAO. Wheat identifies a type of performance auditor he calls an "activist auditor."
Activist auditors independently identify major social and policy problems in their
jurisdiction, go beyond the mandate of an audit initiated by an outside authority if such is
called for, self-initiate important audits, issue special reports such as budget surveys and
reports on financial trends in their jurisdiction, adhere to generally accepted government
audit standards, and see the public and its representatives as the audit's client. Wheat
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contends that GAO's yellow book standards, point auditors toward an activist stance.
Some obstacles to activist auditing are: elected officials and public managers not eager to
share the spotlight, time frames that are much shorter than for other audits, results are
seldom, if ever, received with universal acclaim, there are always groups who are
threatened by this type of audit, legislative intent is often difficult to determine, data may
be suspect, and there is often little agreement on performance measures.
Jonas (1999) argues that most legislative evaluation agencies grew out of the
general state government reforms of the 1970s. Legislative program evaluation units were
established or existing financial audit units were assigned the performance audit function.
Where virtually no legislative program evaluation units existed 30 years ago, a majority
of state legislatures now have strong units. Legislative program evaluation adds value to
the overall field of program evaluation in the following ways: 1) its focus on utilization
affects both the language and techniques of evaluation; 2) systematic development of
databases aid information gathering; 3) virtually unlimited access to information aids farreaching findings; and 4) adaptive research methods result from short timelines mandated
by the legislature. Good legislative program evaluation offices improve the prospects for
utilization through responsiveness, relevance, language, and quality. Jonas posits that
term limits may cause legislatures to be less receptive to the value of legislative program
evaluation but he cites no evidence, and conducts no research, to support this supposition.
Berry, Turcotte and Latham (2002) discuss what they see as a change in the
paradigm of legislative program evaluation. The older paradigm saw evaluation staff as
more independent of the legislature. The new paradigm sees them working more closely
with legislators, on shorter time deadlines, with more policy influence and involving
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stakeholders more directly. The authors designate two types of state legislative program
evaluation units. Type I is traditional legislative auditors and auditor generals who have
expanded their duties to include program evaluation. These units are independent but
often report to a legislative committee. Type II are units that conduct performance audits
and program evaluation but are not part of an auditor general's office. Most of these units
report to joint legislative committees or commissions. This type also includes
independent legislative offices that are headed by a director. About half the 43 units they
identify are type I and half type II. Some of the legislative program evaluation units they
identify are administratively housed in the executive branch. They find that "federal
requirements appear to have had no significant impact on setting the work of state
legislative PE [program evaluation] units" (p. 78). They cite literature that specific
evaluation offices don't exist as much in the executive branch as in the legislative
because each specific executive branch program manager is expected to act as an
evaluator when overseeing the program's budget.
They helpfully conducted a survey of program evaluation units that went beyond
just staffing and logistical questions. They list goals of these units derived from their
survey. The goals include: achieving legislative responsiveness while maintaining
appropriate independence, communicating effectively and making use of technology to
communicate results, producing more information in short time periods while
maintaining quality, developing hybrid methods of descriptive and analytical work, and
educating legislators about agency programs and operations. The authors identify six
roles for program evaluation units: 1) educating legislators and citizens, 2) supporting
legislative oversight with information, 3) providing timely information, 4) being
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proficient and technologically sophisticated evaluators, 5) being clear communicators,
and 6) protecting the legislative institution.

Methodology: Surveys

Stutzman and Rainey (1981) address Florida state executive branch officials'
views of program evaluation and auditing. They mention that in 1967 in Florida the duty
to evaluate public programs was placed on the auditor general, accountable to the
legislature. The auditor general mostly concentrates on "program inputs and processes—
financial audits and compliance audits" (p. 83) but recently some emphasis on "impact
studies" (p. 83). The paper reviews a mail survey of Florida executive branch
administrators' views of program evaluation, for example asking what activities they see
as program evaluation. Unfortunately, the survey did not address issues such as ways
program evaluation could be used to improve programs or possible constraints on the
acceptance of program evaluation among executive branch officials.
Botner (1986) reports on a 1985 survey of all 50 states focusing on their post
auditing procedures. He defines postaudit as an "audit of the transaction after the
expenditure has occurred" (p. 13). The postaudit "conceptually, is a legislative function
to be performed by an auditor responsible to the legislature" (p. 13) while preaudits are
traditionally an executive function performed by a comptroller. Botner uses Knighton's
(1967) definitions of financial, management/operations, program, and performance
audits. He surveyed the postauditors in all 50 states as identified by the Council of State
Governments. The survey contains information about how postauditors are selected (by
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the legislature, elected, appointed by the governor, etc.). Botner finds that 28 state
postauditors are selected by legislatures or a legislative body.
Walton and Brown (1990) conducted a survey of state auditors to determine
potential conflicts between auditors' roles and legislators' roles. A slight plurality saw no
conflict while a sizable minority did see conflicts between the two roles. The two biggest
complaints reported were the legislature didn't act on audit findings and the legislature
inappropriately attempted to control an audit.
Mohan (1997) conducted a survey of legislative program evaluation units in the
states. There were 65 National Legislative Performance Evaluation Society (NLPES)
member agencies at the time, 54 responded, 7 of those did not conduct program
evaluations or performance audits. About a third of the agencies conducted both
performance audits and program evaluations. Approximately one third each performed
either program evaluations or performance audits without performing the other. Most
units use the GAGAS performance auditing standards while very few use the American
Evaluation Association's (AEA) Guiding Principles for Evaluators or the Joint
Committee's Program Evaluation Standards.
NPLES (2004) conducted a follow-up survey to Mohan's (1997) and NLPES'
earlier survey (VanLandingham, Kinton, Boerner, & Zelio, 2000). The results were
similar to the one conducted by Mohan, though the 2004 survey was much more
comprehensive. The majority of the units surveyed are attached to an auditor's office.
About one-third are independent legislative units. The results are similar to 1997
regarding the use of standards; about half follow the GAGAS performance auditing
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standards while very few follow the AEA's Guiding Principles or the Joint Committee
standards. There is some useful information on directives by the overseeing agencies.
Schwartz and Mayne (2005) look at how government organizations in different
countries evaluate their evaluations, performance audits and performance reporting
information. They cite Schwartz (1999) as a previous report examining or metaevaluating
audit reports. Their methodology is basically a survey of these organizations asking them
what type of quality assurance systems they have in place. The authors did not look
directly at the quality of the work. The surveys show that political concerns are one factor
inhibiting quality assurance activities in this area.
Many of these surveys reviewed here fail to address topics that could improve the
practice of LPE in the states. Instead they focus on descriptive issues about LPE offices
and their staff members. This information is helpful to understand the units. However, an
exploration of issues such as the processes LPE units use to evaluate their own work, the
methodological techniques they use to determine causality, and the mechanism they have
in place to share findings and techniques with other LPE units would do more to advance
the practice of legislative program evaluation.

Methodology: Case Studies

Chadwin (1974) edited a volume containing case studies from four states with
legislative program evaluation units at the time. The differences in terminology apparent
today in legislative program evaluation were apparent then. These states called their
reports a program audit (New York), a program analysis (New Jersey), an audit
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(Hawai'i), and a comprehensive review (Illinois). All four short case studies concentrate
on outlining their objectives and methodologies. They also discuss the impacts of their
respective studies and the negative response (in three of the four cases) from officials at
the agencies under review.
Roberts and Pollitt (1994) present a case study of a VFM audit completed by the
British National Audit Office. The authors view the VFM as a step beyond traditional
auditing but still not a "full-blooded evaluation" (p. 527). One way in which it falls short
of a program evaluation is that VFMs in Britain are not permitted to "question the
appropriateness of government policy objectives themselves" (p. 545). Roberts and Pollitt
see three limitations of the VFMs: (1) reports rarely specify methods for improvement;
(2) their scope of work is primarily financial; and (3) their dependence on parliament
means they are constrained by time.
Bezruki, Meuller and McKim (1999) focus on the experience of the Wisconsin
Legislative Audit Bureau and how they see utilization of their evaluative work by their
legislature. In Wisconsin, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee overseas the legislative
audit bureau. The paper contains three case studies on legislative utilization. The authors
state the "evaluations that suggest possible causes but no remedies or that recommend
further study have limited use in the legislative process" (p. 21).
Mclntire and Glaze (1999) investigated systems modeling, or computer
simulation, as a methodological tool for legislative program evaluation. They recount a
simulation the authors conducted for the Oregon Legislative Fiscal Office. They
concluded that "[bjecause legislation often affects multiple agencies or issues, models
based on budgetary, staffing and process relationships can provide relevant insights for
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policy recommendations" (p. 59). However, state legislative program evaluation units
need sufficient staffing, funding, training, and time to be able to utilize systems modeling
systems in their evaluations.

Methodology: Directly Examining Reports

A methodology directly examining the products of legislative program
evaluation—the reports themselves—seems to be crucial to get a good idea of what is
actually happening in the field. However, very little of this approach has been
undertaken. Funkhouser (2005) cites the scant literature on performance auditing. He sets
an agenda for scholarly analysis of performance auditing including: content analysis of
actual audit reports, examination of impact of audit organizations, and an examination of
the differences in process, products and results in audit organizations that arise from
different structures.
Brown and Craft (1980) analyze reports from the small number of states with
performance audit sections at the time. They find no difference in reports issued by
comprehensive postaudit staff and special purpose committee staff. The criteria they used
included report topic, report length, staff effort expended, report focus, data gathering
techniques, presence of recommendations, and executive agency response. They found
that most reports confirm, and provide documentation for, what legislators already
believed but did not know for certain. They posited reasons why some reports are
implemented while others are not. Reports that were released at the beginning of a
legislative session, received media coverage, and included concrete findings and
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recommendations were likely to be acted upon. The methodology used in a report had no
affect on whether the report's recommendations were implemented.
Walker (1985) reviewed a broad sample of reports from the GAO (35 in their
entirety and 100 summaries). Walker did not present his criteria for reviewing these
reports. His review of reports was one aspect of a larger review of the GAO. That review
included "213 anonymous interviews with executives and auditors at all levels of the
[GAO], congressmen and staffers, agency officials, and newsmen" (p. 360).
Brown (1988) provides some numbers on state legislative evaluation within the
Illinois Auditor General's office. Though Brown's observations seem to be based more
on experience than a strict review methodology, she reports that 30 percent of the
problems or issues highlighted in audit reports concern matters of policy for the Illinois
legislature to address. These are either technical or substantive changes to law or issues
of public policy. When recommendations are offered in the audit reports they are in to the
form of alternatives to be considered by the legislature. The other 70 percent of problems
or issues addressed in audit reports concern administrative matters that are directed to the
executive branch agency under review.
Schwartz (1999) examined "effectiveness audits or evaluations" (p. 513) in
different countries to see how they really address effectiveness in light of the political
difficulties of doing so. Schwartz's methodology was to examine the content of three
audit reports from each of six countries. Curiously, instead of selecting random reports he
asked certain SAI representatives from these countries for their three best audits. He tried
to determine if they are really looking at effectiveness and how they negotiate the
potential political problems with really looking at effectiveness. He found that "most
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state auditors have not met the challenge non-politicized, professional and objective
outcome evaluations in place of agency-based evaluations which are perceived to be
infected by political interests" (p. 522). He concludes that the main reason for this is the
auditors' desire to avoid the political dangers inherent in questioning the effectiveness of
programs.

Metaevaluation

Michael Scriven first introduced the term metaevaluation in 1969. At the time the
term applied to the evaluation of a plan to evaluate educational products. Since, Scriven
has used metaevaluation to refer to an evaluation of evaluations (Scriven, 1991).
As in conducting an evaluation, when conducting a metaevaluation one uses
standards (or values and criteria) to judge the evaluations under review. There are several
sets of standards that can be used to metaevaluate evaluations—professional standards
like the American Evaluation Association's Guiding Principles for Evaluators, the
Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) or the Joint Committee's
Program Evaluation Standards (PES). Evaluations can also be metaevaluated against
various evaluation models—Stufflebeam's CIPP model (Stuffiebeam, 2000a), Patton's
Utilization-Focused Evaluation Model (Patton, 1997), Guba and Lincoln's Constructivist
Evaluation model (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) and others.
Some metaevaluators conduct metaevaluations with access to a broad scope of
information—interviews with the evaluators and stakeholders and review of the
evaluators' data. Others have completed metaevaluations using only the final evaluation
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report, or even an executive summary of the report. For two main reasons the
metaevaluations for this study were conducted using only the final evaluation report.
First, to conduct a comprehensive metaevaluation (interviewing evaluators and
stakeholders, reviewing raw data, etc.) would be entirely too time consuming given the
large sample of reports reviewed. Other endeavors to metaevaluate large numbers of
evaluations have used solely the evaluation reports. (Bickman, 1997; Bollen, Paxon, &
Morishima, 2005; Cooksy & Caracelli, 2005; Forss & Carlsson, 1997; Hoogerwerf, 1992;
Kruse, 2005; Larson, et al, 1979; Scott-Little, Hamann, & Jurs, 2002) Second, LPE
reports are somewhat different from other evaluation reports. These reports are produced
for the use of legislators and as such are typically briefer and less technical than many
other evaluation reports. There is value in developing a process to metaevaluate these
reports solely by reviewing the report itself. Users in contexts other than the specific state
legislature for which the original report is produced need a way to evaluate the quality of
reports. Such a process could aid staff and legislators in other jurisdictions in determining
how useful an evaluation report is to their own policy development.
The few published papers that metaevaluate multiple studies in a particular
content area or general field vary greatly in their respective scopes and methodologies.
Table 1 lists each study's author(s), year published, number of evaluation reports
metaevaluated, whether the reports metaevaluated consisted of a random sample of a
larger population of reports, whether the metaevaluators relied solely on the evaluation
reports, and other data sources examined if the metaevaluator did not rely solely on the
evaluation report. The number of reports metaevaluated ranges from just a few to over
200. Only one study (Hoogerwerf, 1992) examined a random sample of a larger
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population of evaluation reports. Similarly, only one study (Chatterji, 2005) examined
data beyond the evaluation report while conducting the metaevaluations.

Table 1. Metaevaluation Literature: Multiple Studies.
Year

Number
of reports

Random
sample used

Relied solely
on reports

Bollen, Paxon, &
Morishima

2005

25

No

Yes

None

Chatterji

2005

No

No

Interviewed evaluator,
reviewed documents

Cooksy & Caracelli

2005

87

No

Yes

None

Leeuw & Cooksy

2005

3

No

Yes

None

Kruse

2005

approx.
200

No

Yes

None

Scott-Little,
Hamarm, & Jurs
Bickman
Forss & Carlsson
Hoogerwerf
Larson, et al.

2002
1997
1997
1992
1979

23
56
277
15
200

No
No
No
Yes
No

Author(s)

Other data examined

None
None
None
None
None

Note. Approx. = approximately.

Following is a brief discussion of the published literature that uses metaevaluation
across multiple evaluations, focusing on the content area, the standards used, and the
number of evaluations included.
Leeuw and Cooksy (2005) contend that metaevaluation "is a method that should
be used to ensure that the meta-studies (either narrative reviews or meta-analyses) are
based on defensible evaluations" (p 96). This is especially important given the context of
state legislative program evaluation. The various state LPE units often seek information
from each other when addressing a certain policy area. Metaevaluation can increase the
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confidence LPE units have in the quality of an evaluation report that they decide to
reference in their own reports.
Leeuw and Cooksy also identify three main uses for metaevaluation: aiding
stakeholder decisions about evaluation use, aiding evaluator/researcher decisions about
including findings from specific evaluations in an evaluation synthesis, and "identifying
strengths and weaknesses in evaluation practice" (p. 97). Metaevaluation is used in the
current study for the latter two uses with an emphasis on the third.
Leeuw and Cooksy highlight a categorization developed and used by Hoogerwerf
(1992), Leeuw (1998), Vedung (1997), Van de Vail (1980) and others. They distinguish
only three criteria: methodology, strategy (type and relevance of evaluative knowledge
produced), and utility. This categorization allows metaevaluators to tailor "standards
within each of the three dimensions of quality" (p. 100).
They then use these three dimensions of quality to metaevaluate three
international development evaluations. They identified five criteria on the methodological
dimension (purpose of the evaluation; criteria of success; data sources; time period; and
types of analyses), three criteria on the strategic dimension (relevance; type of knowledge
produced; attribution addressed; and findings related to the evaluation's goals) and three
criteria on the utility dimension (what works, why, and when; recommendations; and
audience) for a total of 11 criteria for the metaevaluation.
Hoogerwerf (1992) looks at how policy evaluation developed in the central
government in the Netherlands. More specifically he addresses how "politicaladministrative authorities judge policy evaluation and its use in the policy process" and
how "researchers judge policy evaluations and their use in the policy process" (p. 215).
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Hoogerwerf presents two diagrams, or lists of metaevaluation criteria. One diagram is
"scientific requirements of an evaluation report" the second is "requirements from policy
practice concerning an evaluation report" (pp. 220 and 221).
The scientific requirements concern theoretical requirements (such as formulation
of the problem, definition of concepts), methodological requirements (such as the validity
and reliability of the research results) and technical requirements (such as the
operationalization of the evaluation criteria). Hoogerwerf designed this list for reports
aimed at the effects of policy. He writes it should not be used when evaluating the
contents or processes of a policy.
The requirements from policy practice are "based on the principle that evaluation
research . . . should be useful to policy practice" (p. 222). An evaluation report should
"provide information which is important to an effective, efficient and legitimate approach
to a certain policy problem" (p. 222). Factors affecting the use of research in the policy
process include "the adaptation of the research report to the need for information in
policy practice, the nature of the policy, and readability for policy makers" (p. 222).
Hoogerwerf discusses his application of these two lists of requirements to a
random sample of 15 "evaluation reports on elements of the sports policy of the Ministry
of Welfare, Public Health and Culture in the Netherlands". He reports that the "main
results of this meta-evaluation are not very positive" (p. 222).
Hoogerwerf concludes by developing "requirements from policy practice to be
imposed on the evaluation process" and "requirements from policy practice to be
imposed on evaluation structure" (p. 224). The requirements for structure are particularly
relevant to the LPE units in the states. These include the requirement that any
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governmental organization or network should include a unit "which is charged with
evaluating the implemented or intended policy, and with stimulating its feedback." This
unit should "have sufficient knowledge on scientific evaluation research," it should "be
so independent that it can perform its duties in an adequate way," and it should be
"responsible for the coordination of the evaluation and of the feedback" (p. 225).
Kruse (2005) discusses a metaevaluation of about 200 reports. This covers all
reports submitted to the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)
over two years. Kruse's metaevaluation criteria focused on the evaluation process, scope,
and team and on methodological issues such as data sources, collection methods and
types of analysis. Under the category of 'types of analysis carried out' the criteria
included: discussion of limitations in methods, cost-effectiveness analysis, lessons
learned and policy/strategy discussions. Reports were graded 'excellent,' 'good,'
'adequate,' or 'inadequate' using the quality criteria developed by Forss and Carlsson
(1997). Kruse found that 45 percent of the evaluations were "good" and 30 percent
"adequate."
Forss and Carlsson (1997) examined evaluation reports commissioned by
development aid agencies in Sweden. They used the four main standards from the PES
(utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy) as a starting point to judge the quality of
these evaluation reports. They describe three paths they could have followed for their
research. First, they could have used a case-study approach to determine "what
motivation stakeholders had, how they were engaged in the process, which methods were
used, how data were analysed and by whom, and what difference the evaluation process
made in the management of activities" (p. 483). This approach would have provided a
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thorough understanding but would have taken much time and resources and they would
have been unable to ensure that the case-studies were representative of the larger
population of evaluations. Second, they could have interviewed aid organization
personnel to get their views on evaluation quality. However, this approach would have
discovered the views of just one of many aid program stakeholders. They decided on a
third approach—to "[a]ssess the evaluation reports through the application of a
standardized format, analysing their coverage, composition of teams, methods of work
etc." (p. 484). They correctly defend their use of this approach based on the fact that it
allowed them to cover a large number of evaluations at relatively low cost.
They concluded that this method can "be expected to provide comprehensive
information on the accuracy and propriety standards, but less concerning utility and
feasibility" (p. 484). They used one of four ratings for each variable: 'excellent,' 'good,'
'adequate,' or 'inadequate.' The study included 277 evaluation reports commissioned by
development aid agencies in Sweden. The authors are not clear on whether this is a
sample (random or otherwise) or the total population of reports over a certain time
period. Ratings were assigned, primarily, by several research assistants who received
training on the criteria and ratings. The research assistants were able to consult with each
other and also to seek input from the authors.
Generally, the authors find that the quality of the evaluations is not good. Also, it
seems that over time (the evaluations examined spanned about 20 years) the quality has
not improved. However, they posit that this may be because they only were able to locate
older evaluations that were good, the worse ones being forgotten.
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They insightfully point out two major drawbacks to their approach to metaevaluation. First, it is difficult to train researchers well to evaluate the evaluation reports.
Second, the process can be rather expensive since it typically takes two to four hours to
review a single evaluation report.
Scott-Little, Hamann, and Jurs (2002) looked at evaluations of after-school
programs. They metaevaluated the reports based on the Joint Committee's PES (1994).
They also examined each evaluation's research design. Their research questions included:
"What are characteristics of after-school evaluation studies that have been disseminated
publicly?" and "To what extent do these evaluation studies conform to evaluation
standards and common requirements for research design?" (p. 389). The authors
identified 43 evaluations of after-school programs and narrowed that number down to 23
to eliminate certain kinds of after-school programs (those that were drop-in or special
programs).
Bollen, Paxon, and Morishima (2005) reviewed 25 of the 240 evaluation reports
from USAID's Democracy and Governance (DG) projects. Their population of 240
reports reflected all DG evaluation reports from the past 30 years. They selected a nonrandom sample, including some reports from each region, each institutional author, and
each subject area plus additional reports that US AID particularly wanted included in the
sample.
Their "review focused on three general and necessary ingredients to quality
evaluations: (a) information on inputs, (b) information on results, and (c) controls for
confounding factors" (p. 190). The authors reveal that their
. . . fundamental principle is that a quality evaluation collects and reports
sufficient information on the first two ingredients and addresses the threats
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to any conclusion of impact presented by the third. For the purposes of this
review, inputs were USAID activities and the resources used to implement
them, and results were the intended outputs, outcomes, and impacts of the
activities, (p. 190)
The review considered four categories of possible confounding factors: alternative
explanations, the direction of the causal relationship, sampling issues, and measurement
issues. For each report, each confounding factor was coded yes, no or slightly for the
following categories: alternative explanations, other donors recorded, prior change
considered, controls considered, and concepts defined. The authors coded yes/no four
categories concerning measurement: measures defined, alternative measures, validity
discussed, and reliability discussed.
They found that "hardly any evaluations" discussed alternative ways to measure
the same criteria or the validity/reliability of the measures used. They concluded that
"[ojverall, the treatment of measurement in these evaluations is largely absent" (p. 198).
Most of the coding was fairly objective. Coders recorded activities, funding, personnel,
the level of outcomes (individual, group, institutional, or national), and the time frame
during which observations were made. They used multiple reviewers claim high interrater reliability, though they undermine their contention by not reporting specific
numbers on this issue.
Chatterji (2005) applies the PES to an international aid evaluation in Bangladesh.
She selected 4 evaluation reports to metaevaluate based on four criteria, the second being
"[t]here is enough available information, through documentary or other sources, to allow
a systematic appraisal of the evaluation practices with respect to a majority of the 30
standards, if not all. (Thus, if the available data were scant, and it led to too many cannot
determine or not applicable conclusions during analysis, the case was dropped.)" (p.
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2382). In addition to reviewing the evaluation reports, she interviewed the lead evaluator
to follow-up on questions. She concludes that the accuracy standard could be
metaevaluated from the report but the feasibility, propriety and utility standards needed
the information provided in the interview.
Bickman (1997) examined all 56 "impact or effectiveness evaluations" published
in Evaluation Review and Evaluation and Program Planning over a ten year period from
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, (p. 1) He and an assistant evaluated each study based on
several variables, drawn from Lipsey's (1988) meta-analysis procedures. Bickman
created two composite scores. One, for several measures of methodological and program
theory quality, ranged from 12 to 50. The second, a composite score derived from "the
sum of quality ratings given to various components of design" ranged from 8 to 24 (p. 4).
Bickman, unfortunately, does not further describe the rating process or the criteria. He
concludes that the reports are not "approaching a ceiling on quality" and "[qjuality has
not changed in the last decade." (p. 4)
Larson, et al. (1979) issue an interim report that examined a sample of 200
evaluation reports out of approximately 1,500 evaluations performed on criminal justice
issues from the late 1960s through the late 1970s. The authors note that "the final report
of an evaluation is unlikely to capture most of the information about an evaluation
necessary to evaluate it comprehensively" (p. 2). They conclude that "the documents
produced in an evaluation constitute only one output of an evaluation: they often tell little
of the inputs to an evaluation, the process by which it was undertaken, or the ultimate
impact of the evaluation" (p. 2). The LPE reports examined here include much
information about the inputs of the evaluation and the process by which it was
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undertaken. This is probably because the GAGAS standards require this information. The
sample they took was "a structured rather than a random sample" (p. 5) because they
selected a certain amount of reports on different types of programs.
Three graduate student readers each read about a third of the 200 evaluation
reports taking about 4 hours per report and completing a 31 item checklist on each report.
The authors note that "this amount of time is small to evaluate any evaluation
satisfactorily" but "it is probably more time than most decision makers would spend on
the report." (p. 15) The "goal of the readings was not to evaluate each evaluation, but
rather to obtain information regarding evaluation input, processes, and outcome, and to
assess in a general way the relevance of the methodology employed, and the quality of
the documentation." (p. 15)
Only four of the 200 evaluation reports indicated the total funding for the
evaluation. The authors rightly believe that this information should be included in
evaluation reports because "[o]ne should be able to assess the value of an evaluation
given known budgetary constraints." (p. 18) It might be added that knowing the costs of
an evaluation is helpful, if not necessary, to determine the evaluation's merit and worth.
In addition 31 percent of the reports documented the time spent on the evaluation.
Cooksy and Caracelli (2005) state that "[tjhe second major purpose for subjecting
a set of studies to metaevaluation is to identify strengths and weaknesses in evaluation
practice in order to develop evaluation capacity" (p. 32). The first major purpose
concerns informing researchers of which studies to include in evaluation syntheses. They
cite Lipsey, Crosse, Dunkle, Pollard, & Stobart (1985) and Bickman (1997) as doing
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large metaevaluations and finding that the studies were marginally methodologically and
conceptually sound.
Cooksy and Caracelli metaevaluated 87 evaluation reports (using just the reports
to conduct the metaevaluations) concerning international agricultural programs. They
note that critical information regarding methodological issues was often missing. This
lack of transparency made it difficult to judge the overall methodological quality.
There is a small body of literature concerning the theoretical aspects of
metaevaluation. This literature addresses questions such as how to conduct a
metaevaluation and when metaevaluation is needed. Below is a discussion focusing on
the question of how much information one needs to conduct a metaevaluation. Does one
need as much information as the original evaluators needed? Does a metaevaluator need
to basically redo the evaluation or can she conduct an appropriate metaevaluation using
only the completed evaluation report?
Sanders (1999), while not addressing this question explicitly, conducted a
metaevaluation of a study published in the American Journal of Evaluation. The
metaevaluation was conducted on the basis of a 20 page summary (printed in AJE) of a
200 page evaluation report. Sanders' metaevaluation was sent to the original evaluation's
authors to correct any inaccuracies. Sanders concludes that "[i]n the absence of the full
evaluation report it is incumbent on a metaevaluator to seek feedback on the accuracy of
a metaevaluation from the primary evaluator" (p. 582). This leads to the conclusion that
given the full evaluation report Sanders believes a legitimate metaevaluation can be
conducted from examining the evaluation report alone.
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Sanders' approach is similar to the approach, used in this study, of conducting a
metaevaluation from the written evaluation report itself, without collecting data from
evaluation subjects as the more comprehensive Stufflebeam (2001a) approach would
have metaevaluation done. Sanders uses the Program Evaluation Standards (PES) and the
AEA's Guiding Principles for Evaluators.
Following the PES, Sanders addresses utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy.
Under the heading of utility he is concerned with issues such as were the intended users
involved in developing evaluation questions, were stakeholders involved in identifying
the criteria on which the evaluand is being judged, were results "disseminated in
audience-friendly directed communications" (p. 578) and were the evaluators well
qualified and independent from the evaluand.
For feasibility he addresses the "practicality, workability and cost of the
evaluation" (p. 579). This includes whether the procedures to collect data were workable,
not offensive or disruptive, and acceptable to the participants.
The propriety standards are "intended to protect participants in the evaluation and
those affected by the study's results" (p. 579). This would include the question of
whether there was a bias, conflict of interest, or misuse of funds by the evaluators. Also,
did the benefit from the evaluation worth the cost of conducting the evaluation.
Finally, the accuracy standards are "concerned with the technical merits of the
evaluation" (p. 580). This area includes whether there was information given in the
evaluation report about the actual means of delivery of the evaluand (how the evaluand
works), were there gaps in the analysis (did the evaluators merely report outputs but not

47

outcomes or results), did the authors describe their quality control procedures for data
collection and their evaluation methodology, and was there "underanalysis" in places.
Cook and Gruder (1978) identify three research traditions relevant to
metaevaluation. The first is a re-analysis of evaluation data, the second is rating
evaluations to see how "technically competent they were in general" (p. 6), and the third
is research on research. This dissertation focuses on the second tradition. They talk about
the high standards of past metaevaluations and whether the evaluations judged needed to
live up to these high standards. They also address the issue of reaching plausible versus
definitive causal conclusions. This point fits in well with the LPE aims of informing
public policy making. LPE reports can greatly add to legislative decision-making, and
thus public policy, by presenting plausible conclusions even if they cannot reach
definitive conclusions.
Cook and Gruber discuss their contention that metaevaluators have a bias toward
the negative. Metaevaluators "want" to make critical findings or surprising findings.
They discuss seven metaevaluation models (p. 17), four are subsequent to the primary
evaluation and three are simultaneous to the primary evaluation. The most basic of the
subsequent metaevaluation models they call the essay review of an evaluation report. An
essay review is completed subsequent to the original evaluation, there is no manipulation
of data from the primary evaluation, and there is a single data set (the single evaluation
report). Their view of an essay review does not include using standards and assessing the
evaluation report against these standards. It is more critiquing various aspects of the
evaluation report and its conclusions.
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Larson and Berliner (1983) discuss what they call the evaluation of evaluations
(or EOE). They contend that the "evaluative study of evaluations requires analysis of
evaluation inputs, process, and outcomes" (p. 155). They define evaluation inputs as an
"inventory of resources and methodologies brought to bear on the evaluation and the
basic elements of the evaluation/program setting" (p. 155). They list 11 aspects of
evaluation inputs including budget, duration, timing, evaluation personnel, methodology
and design, data and data limitations, and expected policy implications. They define
evaluation process as "[a]ctual conduct of the evaluation compared with that planned in
the evaluation design" (p. 157). Aspects of the evaluation process include interactions
between evaluators and program staff members, the ease with which one can adapt the
evaluation design, methodology, and communication of findings. Evaluation outcomes
are the "decisions influenced by the evaluation" (p. 160). These decisions included a
funder's decision to increase, decrease, or suspend funding, decisions by program staff to
modify the program, and decisions by clients to alter their participation in the program.
Larson and Berliner point out that the level of documentation included in a final
report of an evaluation is important to determining if an external EOE can be conducted.
They discuss previous research (Larson, et al, 1979) that shows documentation on a
number of variables lacking in a sample of criminal justice program evaluations. They
also found a lack of reporting on an evaluation's methodology. "Such lack of selfreporting reduces the ability of decision makers to assess the quality of information
produced by the evaluation" (p. 161).
Pawson (2002a, 2002b) contends that evaluators generally agree that there is no
single best way for evaluating social programs or for conducting "systematic review[s]"
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of evaluations. His goal is to lay out a new model for informing evidence-based practice,
what he calls "realist synthesis." Realist synthesis contends it is "much more sensible to
base any systematic review on 'families of mechanisms' rather than on 'families of
programmes'" (Pawson, 2002b, p. 344). These mechanisms for influencing behavior are
more important to study together than are the programs that make use of the mechanisms.
Pawson offers an insightful quote that captures how legislative program
evaluation, and the systematic evaluation of LPE reports, can aid the development and
improvement of public policy:
Few major public initiatives these days are mounted without a sustained
attempt to evaluate them. Rival policy ideas are thus run through endless
trials with plenty of error and it is often difficult to know which of them
really have withstood the test of time. It is arguable, therefore, that the
prime function of evaluation research should be to take the longer view.
By building a systematic evidence base that captures the ebb and flow of
programme ideas we might be able to adjudicate between contending
policy claims and so capture a progressive understanding of 'what works'.
(Pawson, 2002a, p 157)

Background and Comparison of Evaluation and Performance Audit Standards

This dissertation uses two explicit sets of professional standards—one for
performance auditing, the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards for
Performance Auditing, and one for program evaluation, the Program Evaluation
Standards. In addition, another framework considered, the Key Evaluation Checklist,
comes from the evaluation field. The two sets of standards were developed through a
similar process consisting of collaboration and committees. Each has been updated since
its first inception. This section will give a background on the development of the GAGAS
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for performance auditing and the Joint Committee's Program Evaluation Standards
showing similarities and differences in their creation and maintenance. The section will
also discuss the similarities and differences of these two standards.

Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards for Performance Auditing

The GAGAS are described as "the floor of acceptable behavior" for professionals.
They are "broad statements of auditors' responsibilities" that "provide an overall
framework for ensuring that auditors have the competence, integrity, objectivity, and
independence in planning, conducting, and reporting on their work" (General Accounting
Office, 2003, p. 1). The 2003 version was the fourth version since the standards were
issued in 1972 (previous revisions were issued in 1988 and 1994). A 2007 revision was
issued in January (and updated in July) with an effective date of January 1, 2008.
The GAGAS indicated that other professional standards, specifically including the
American Evaluation Association's Guiding Principles for Evaluators and the Joint
Committee's Program Evaluation Standards, are "not incorporated into GAGAS but can
be used in conjunction with GAGAS" (p. 9).
The GAGAS have been applicable to performance auditing since they were first
issued in 1972. Though that first edition did not refer specifically to performance audits,
it did "provide for a scope of audit that includes not only financial and compliance
auditing but also auditing for economy, efficiency, and achievement of desired results"
(Comptroller General of the United States, 1972, p. 2). The 1981 revision notes that the
term performance audit is one of several terms "used for economy and efficiency audits
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and program results audits" (Comptroller General, 1981, p. 68). However, that revision
also indicates that the terms "economy and efficiency" and "program results" audits
should be used "in audit reports to avoid misunderstanding" (p. 12).
It was the 1988 revision that introduced sections on field work and reporting
standards specifically for performance audits. This revision also offered a definition of
performance audits that simply included economy and efficiency and program audits
(Comptroller General, 1988, p. 2-3). As recently as that year state legislative program
evaluation units did not widely accept the GAGAS performance auditing standards and
did not follow them in their performance auditing and evaluation work (Greathouse and
Funkhouser, 1988).
The 2003 revision continued the previous revision's model of sections for field
work and reporting standards for performance audits. This revision also offered a more
detailed definition of performance audits. They are audits that
entail an objective and systematic examination of evidence to provide an
independent assessment of the performance and management of a program
against objective criteria as well as assessments that provide a prospective
focus or that synthesize information on best practices or crosscutting
issues. (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 21)

Under the general heading of performance audits the 2003 revision of the GAGAS
addresses "program effectiveness

and results audits," "internal control audits,"

"compliance audits," and other activities audit organizations undertake that provide a
"prospective focus or may provide guidance, best practice information, and information
that cuts across program or organizational lines, or summary information on issues
already studied or under study by an audit organization" (p. 24).
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The GAGAS details performance auditing standards in an introduction and three
chapters. The GAGAS also provides standards for financial audits, attestation
engagements, and nonaudit services provided by audit organizations. The introduction
and the first chapter provide general standards for all types of audits. The introduction
includes sections on purpose, applicability, relationship between GAGAS and other
professional standards, accountability, and roles and responsibilities. The first chapter is
divided into categories for independence, professional judgment, competence, and quality
control and assurance. The next two chapters (field work standards and reporting
standards) provide specific standards for performance audits. The field work standards
are divided into planning, supervision, evidence, and documentation. The reporting
standards are divided into form, content, quality elements, and issuance and distribution.
Absent from the GAGAS is any mention of an auditor's responsibility to look
beyond program or policy goals and objectives. There is also no mention of examining
comparison programs or policies when conducting a performance audit. The only brief
mention of comparisons in the GAGAS comes in a definition of analytical evidence.
Combining the introduction and all three chapters we are left with 17 separate
areas of standards. This compares with 30 separate standards for the Program Evaluation
Standards (seven utility standards, three feasibility standards, eight propriety standards,
and twelve accuracy standards).
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Program Evaluation Standards

The forerunner of the Program Evaluation Standards was the Standards for
Evaluations of Educational Programs, Projects, and Materials published by the Joint
Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation in 1981. The Joint Committee was
originally formed in 1975 after a committee convened by the American Educational
Research Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Council
on Measurement in Education to examine testing decided to spin off a subcommittee
regarding program evaluation (Yarbrough, Shulha, & Caruthers, 2004). The Program
Evaluation Standards' birth through the cooperation of professional organizations
contrasts with that of the GAGAS, which were originated by a government agency
(though with the involvement of professional organizations).
This original conception of the PES was divided into the same four categories as
the current PES (utility, feasibility, propriety, accuracy). The original GAGAS were
divided into four sections: an introduction and general standards (as in the 2003 version),
examination and evaluation standards, and reporting standards.
Table 2 shows each PES standard and its corresponding GAGAS standard. Not all
PES standards have corresponding GAGAS standards. Most notably, the PES propriety
standards do not have a corresponding category of standards in the GAGAS. The PES
utility and accuracy standards correspond roughly with the GAGAS field work and
reporting standards.
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Table 2. Program Evaluation Standards Versus GAGAS.
Corresponding GAGAS standard(s)

PES standard
Ul Stakeholder identification
U2 Evaluator credibility

No corresponding standard
General standard 3.39 - Competence

U3 Information scope and
selection
U4 Values identification

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.41-Complete
No corresponding standard

U5 Report clarity

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.50 - Clear

U6 Report timeliness and
dissemination

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.39-Timeliness

U7 Evaluation impact
Fl Practical procedures
F2 Political viability
F3 Cost effectiveness
PI Service orientation
P2 Formal agreements
P3 Rights of human subjects
P4 Human interactions

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.49 - Convincing
No corresponding standard
No corresponding standard
No corresponding standard
No corresponding standard
No corresponding standard
No corresponding standard
No corresponding standard

P5 Complete and fair assessment

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.41 -Complete

P6 Disclosure of findings

Introduction, roles and responsibilities, 1.25 •-- Auditors'
responsibilities

P7 Conflict of interest

Introduction, roles and responsibilities, 1.24 - Auditors'
responsibilities

P8 Fiscal responsibility

General standards, 3.19a- External impairments
General standards, 3.51 - Quality control and assurance
Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.29 - Recommendations

Al Program documentation

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.43 - Accurate

A2 Context analysis

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.13 -Findings

A3 Described purposes and
procedures

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.08 - Objectives, scope, and methodology

A4 Defensible information

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,

sources

8.38 - Report quality elements
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Table 2—continued
PES standard

Corresponding GAGAS standard(s)

A5 Valid information

Field work standards for performance audits, 7.31 - Identifying
sources of audit evidence
Field work standards for performance audits, 7.52a - Tests of
evidence
Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.49-Convincing

A6 Reliable information

Field work standards for performance audits, 7.31 - Identifying
sources of audit evidence

A7 Systematic information

General standards, 3.49 - Quality control and assurance
Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.45 -Accurate

A8 Analysis of quantitative
information

No corresponding standard

A9 Analysis of qualitative
information

No corresponding standard

A10 Justified conclusions

Field work standards for performance audits, 7.48 - Evidence
Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality Elements,
8.49 - Convincing

All Impartial reporting

Reporting standards for performance audits, report quality elements,
8.46-Objective
General standards, 3.07 - Personal impairments

A12 Metaevaluation

Introduction, roles and responsibilities, 1.27 - Audit organizations'
responsibilities
General standards, 3.49 - Quality control and assurance

For ease of presentation this table, and the subsequent discussion, follows the PES
through the utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy standards and ties each to
corresponding GAGAS standards.

Stakeholder Identification (Ul)

The PES stakeholder identification standard requires "[p]ersons involved in or
affected by the evaluation should be identified, so that their needs can be addressed"
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(Joint Committee, 1994, p. 25). The PES locates this standard within the utility category,
stressing that an "evaluation planned with stakeholders and conducted to meet their
information needs is likely to attend to and receive a positive response" (Joint
Committee, 1994, p. 25).
This is one area where the GAGAS is largely silent. The GAGAS repeatedly
refers to subject of a performance audit as the "audited entity." The GAGAS does
recognize the link between certain stakeholders and performance audit use. There are
references to the auditor's responsibility to assist the audited entity in understanding the
findings and recommendations of the audit (General Accounting Office, p. 163).
However, there are no requirements that an auditor identify and assess the needs of either
the audited entity or other stakeholders.
The PES stakeholder identification standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) is incorporated into the metaevaluation
criteria under the same name in the preliminaries section.

U2 Evaluator Credibility

Credibility is linked to utility because an evaluator with credibility is important to
the acceptance and use of the evaluation findings. As the PES phrases the issue,
evaluators "should be both trustworthy and competent to perform the evaluation, so that
the findings achieve maximum credibility and acceptance" (Joint Committee, 1994, p.
31). The PES also suggests that evaluators establish credibility with stakeholders at the
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beginning of the process and consider not proceeding if an appropriate degree of
credibility cannot be secured.
The GAGAS competence standard is most closely associated with the PES
credibility standard. The competence standard, included in the general GAGAS
standards, provides that the audit staff "should collectively possess adequate professional
competence for the tasks required" (General Accounting Office, p. 52). Technical
knowledge and competence and continuing professional education are the two
substandards under competence. The GAGAS places the responsibility for ensuring
auditor competence on the individual audit organizations. This highlights a recurring
difference between the GAGAS and the PES. GAGAS is much more directed at
organizations while the PES is directed towards individual evaluators and individual
evaluation reports. An additional difference between this GAGAS standard and the PES
credibility standard is that the competence standard is not explicitly linked to the
acceptance or the utility of the audit.
Both the PES evaluator credibility standard, which is not identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation, and the GAGAS
competence standard are not incorporated into the metaevaluation criteria. Determining
the degree of competence and credibility of auditors and evaluators would have been
exceedingly difficulty using just the evaluation and audit reports.
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U3 Information Scope and Selection

The PES provides that "[information collected should be broadly selected to
address pertinent questions about the program and be responsive to the needs and
interests of clients and other specified stakeholders." (Joint Committee, p. 37)
A similar standard under the GAGAS is listed under the heading complete in the
reporting standards for performance audits. Complete is a substandard under report
quality elements. The GAGS requires audit reports to "contain all evidence needed to
satisfy the audit objectives and promote an adequate and correct understanding of the
matters reported" (General Accounting Office, p. 174).
Here we see the GAGAS standards refer to satisfying the audit objectives while
the PES stresses the need for the information to respond to the needs of clients and
stakeholders. Under the GAGAS performance auditing objectives can be broad or narrow
including such areas as "assessing program effectiveness and results; economy and
efficiency; internal control; compliance with legal or other requirements; and objectives
related to providing prospective analyses, guidance, or summary information" (General
Accounting Office, 2003, p. 21). In contrast, the PES is more focused on the "program in
terms of all important variables . . . whether or not stakeholders specifically ask for such
information" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 37).
The PES information scope and selection standard (identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS complete
standard are incorporated into the metaevaluation criteria under the complete criteria in
the methodology section.
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U4 Values Identification

Values, which literally supply the root for evaluation, are heavily stressed in the
PES. The values identification standard provides that the "perspectives, procedures, and
rationale used to interpret the findings should be carefully described, so that the bases for
value judgments are clear" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 43). Evaluators, clients, and other
stakeholders should "thoughtfully determine the approach to be followed in assigning
values to the obtained information, and they should reveal and justify their chosen
approach" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 43).
The GAGAS standards do not address the issue of values, instead focusing on
objectives—defined as "questions about the program that auditors seek to answer"
(General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 126). Though these questions often raise valueladen issues such as effectiveness, results and efficiency (see discussion above regarding
performance auditing objectives) the language of values is not broached in the GAGAS.
The PES values identification standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) is incorporated into the metaevaluation
criteria under identification of values in the preliminaries section.
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U5 Report Clarity

Evaluation reports should clearly describe the "program being evaluated,
including its context, and the purposes, procedures, and findings of the evaluation" (Joint
Committee, 1994, p. 49). This clarity is important for both credibility and utility.
The GAGAS standards include a nearly identical requirement. One of the report
quality elements substandards, 8.50, is clear. This standard is somewhat narrower in its
application than is the corresponding PES standard. The GAGAS clear standard requires
a "report be easy to read and understand" and be "prepared in language as clear and
simple as the subject permits" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 176). This standard,
unlike the comparable PES standard, does not address specific areas that need to be
clearly reported (such as the program, context, purposes, and procedures).
The PES report clarity standard (identified by the Joint Committee as particularly
relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS clear standard are incorporated into
the metaevaluation criteria under clear in the results section.

U6 Report Timeliness and Dissemination

"Evaluators should communicate evaluation findings to intended users at times
when the information can best be used" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 53). Under report
quality elements, the GAGAS timely substandard (8.39) similarly requires an audit report
"to provide relevant information in time to respond to officials of the audited entity,
legislative officials, and other users' legitimate needs" (General Accounting Office, 2003,
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p. 173). Both standards make provisions for reporting interim information (i.e. before the
issuance of a final report). Both also suggest planning and agreements with clients and
other users.
The PES report timeliness and dissemination standard (identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS timely
standard are incorporated into the metaevaluation criteria under timeliness in the results
section.

U7 Evaluation Impact

To increase the likelihood an evaluation will be used "[e]valuations should be
planned, conducted, and reported in ways that encourage follow-through by stakeholders"
(Joint Committee, 1994, p. 59). This is an affirmative requirement for an evaluator that
can extend beyond the issuance of the final report. Evaluators should not "assume
improvements will occur automatically once the evaluation report is completed" but
should actively assist stakeholders in pursuing those improvements.
While the GAGAS has no comparable standard, auditors are required to produce
reports that are convincing enough for the "report users to recognize the validity of the
findings, the reasonableness of the conclusions, and the benefit of implementing the
recommendations" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 176).
The PES evaluation impact standard (though identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) is not incorporated into the
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metaevaluation criteria because it would not be possible to determine report impact solely
from examining the report itself.

Fl Practical Procedures

Evaluation procedures should "keep disruption to a minimum while needed
information is obtained" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 65). Once again, the GAGAS does
not include a comparable standard concerning feasibility. However, two sections do
mention the importance of determining feasible audit objectives (objectives, scope and
methodology; 8.09 and understanding the program; 7.10).
The PES practical procedures standard was not identified by the Joint Committee
as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation and is not incorporated into the
metaevaluation criteria.

F2 Political Viability

The inclusion of this standard in the PES, and its absence from the GAGAS,
illustrates the different contexts of these two professional standards. The GAGAS is
designed to direct the actions of government employees who "need to be sufficiently
removed from political pressures to ensure that they can conduct their audits objectively
and report their findings, opinions, and conclusions objectively without fear of political
repercussions" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 49). The PES are intended for a
much broader audience—an audience who both uses and conducts evaluations. The Joint

63

Committee writes that the Program Evaluation Standards "have been developed for use
by teachers, administrators, school board members, trainers, evaluators, curriculum
specialists, legislators, personnel administrators, counselors, community leaders, business
and educational associations, parents, and others" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 1).
The language in this PES standard calling for evaluators to anticipate "the
different positions of various interest groups, so that their cooperation may be obtained"
shows the value the Joint Committee places on gaining the support of various evaluation
stakeholders (p. 71). The GAGAS, in contrast, does not address an auditor's need to gain
support or cooperation. This may display an assumption that a government auditor has an
inherent authority that necessarily leads to cooperation.
The PES political viability standard, which was not identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation, is not incorporated into
the metaevaluation criteria.

F3 Cost Effectiveness

An evaluation "should be efficient and produce information of sufficient value, so
that the resources expended can be justified" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 77). The PES
simply states that an evaluation is cost effective if its benefits are greater than or equal to
its costs. Evaluators are to design an evaluation so as to maximize the benefits and
minimize the costs. It is not sufficient to merely produce an evaluation design in which
benefits outweigh costs, when there are multiple possible designs the one with the best
cost-benefit combination should be undertaken.
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The GAGAS is silent on the cost-effectiveness of performance audits. This is
surprising because much of the purpose for performance auditing is increasing
accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness in government operations. If an audit results
in decreased costs, or increased efficiencies for an agency or program, any savings need
to be measured against the cost incurred to produce the savings (i.e., the cost of the
performance audit). However, the topic of cost-effectiveness in the GAGAS is only
addressed in terms of the cost-effectiveness of programs and organizations audited.
The PES cost effectiveness standard, which was not identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation, is not incorporated into
the metaevaluation criteria because of a lack of information in the reports about the costs
of conducting the reports.

PI Service Orientation

This standard provides that an evaluation should be "designed to assist
organizations to address and effectively serve the needs of the full range of targeted
populations" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 83). The GAGAS addresses this service
orientation at the level of the auditor instead of the level of the audit itself. Under the
section covering auditors' responsibilities the GAGAS provides that auditors "in
discharging their professional responsibilities . . . need to observe the principles of
serving the public interest" and "act in a way that will serve the public interest, honor the
public trust, and uphold their professionalism" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 13-
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14) The GAGAS embodies the belief that accountability "is fundamental to serving the
public interest" (p. 14).
The PES service orientation standard, which was identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation, is not incorporated into
the metaevaluation criteria because of a lack of information in the reports about the
service orientation of the reports.

P2 Formal Agreements

The PES requires evaluators and their clients to agree, in writing, to the duties of each
party and the process and timeline for the evaluation. This standard, like many PES
standards, assumes an independent, outside evaluator working for a client. This model is
not assumed under the GAGAS.
The GAGAS standards addressing objectives, scope, and methodology come the
closest to paralleling the PES formal agreements standard. However, the GAGAS
standards are intended to help "report users to understand the purpose of the audit and the
nature of the audit work performed, to provide perspective as to what is reported, and to
understand any significant limitations in audit objectives, scope, or methodology"
(General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 160). Since government auditor working under the
GAGAS are typically working under direct employers/supervisors the need for formal
agreements is not as great as in the case of independent consultants working for an
organization.

66

The PES formal agreements standard, which was not identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation, is not incorporated into
the metaevaluation criteria because the evaluators in the LPE context are employees of
the evaluation funders (the legislators). Information concerning "[obligations of the
formal parties to an evaluation" is covered in the scope and objectives criteria under
preliminaries (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 87).

P3 Rights of Human Subjects

The obligation of evaluators to respect and protect the rights of human subjects in
the design and conduct of an evaluation is strongly stated in the PES. The GAGAS does
not address human subjects' rights nearly as strongly. The GAGAS does however outline
auditors' responsibilities to "serve the public interest", respect an audited entity's
"confidentiality laws, rules, or policies", and "observe both the form and the spirit of
technical and ethical standards" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 13, 14, 15).
These GAGAS standards are aimed to ensure the independence and objectivity of
the auditors and, consequently, the credibility of the audit findings. This means that the
GAGAS is virtually silent on the issue of protecting the human subjects who may be
involved with auditors in the collection of data.
The PES rights of human subjects standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) is incorporated into the metaevaluation
criteria under the same name in the preliminaries section.
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P4 Human Interactions

Human interactions, as identified by the PES, pertain to "evaluators' interpersonal
transactions that affect the feelings and self-respect of those who participate in an
evaluation or are affected by an evaluation" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 99), This is a
broader group than human subjects and a broader responsibility than respecting rights.
This standard requires evaluators to respect feelings. There is no corresponding standard
in the GAGAS.
The PES human interactions standard, which was not identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation, is not incorporated into
the metaevaluation criteria.

PS Complete and Fair Assessment

The program evaluation standards require an evaluation to be "complete and fair
in its examination and recording of strengths and weaknesses of the program being
evaluated" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 105). The GAGAS standards cover similar ground,
while using slightly different language. The reporting standards for performance audits,
8.41, contend that completeness "requires that the report contain all evidence needed to
satisfy the audit objectives and promote an adequate and correct understanding of the
matters reported" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 174).
Again the GAGAS standards are focused on the scope and objectives of the
performance audit while the PES does not mention the evaluation's goals but instead
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concentrates on the strengths and weaknesses of the program. The PES also state that
"[e]ven when the primary purpose of an evaluation is to determine the weaknesses of an
object, it is essential to identify strengths as well" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 105).
The PES complete and fair assessment standard (identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) is incorporated into the
metaevaluation criteria under the same name in the preliminaries section. The GAGAS
complete, 8.41, standard is also incorporated into the metaevaluation criteria under this
section.

P6 Disclosure of Findings

The PES requires "the formal parties to an evaluation" to ensure evaluation
findings are made "accessible to the persons affected by the evaluation" (Joint
Committee, 1994, p. 109). This disclosure requirement is linked to the evaluation's
credibility. The general GAGAS standards require all auditors, when reporting their
results, to disclose "all material or significant facts known to them which, if not
disclosed, could mislead knowledgeable users, misrepresent the results, or conceal
improper or unlawful practices" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 15).
Under the same general standard—Auditor's Responsibilities—the GAGAS calls
on auditors to "maintain and broaden public confidence" in auditors and their work. This
is another area where the GAGAS and the PES differ slightly. The PES is much more
concentrated on public confidence, or stakeholder confidence, in evaluation reports and
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evaluation findings. The GAGAS frequently refers to public confidence in auditors as a
profession.
The PES disclosure of findings standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) is not incorporated into the
metaevaluation criteria because evaluating the extent and effectiveness of disclosure is
very difficult using just the evaluation or audit report.

P7 Conflict of Interest

As similar case where the GAGAS focuses on auditors while the PES focuses on
processes and results is in the area of conflict of interest. Both the PES (P7) and the
GAGAS (auditors' responsibilities, 1.24) address conflicts of interest. The PES requires
conflicts of interest to be "dealt with openly and honestly" (Joint Committee, 1994, p.
115). The PES states that conflict exist when "the personal or financial interests of an
evaluator might either influence an evaluation or be affected by the evaluation" (Joint
Committee, 1994, p. 115). The PES contains several steps for dealing with actual and
potential conflicts including clearly identifying possible conflicts in discussions with
clients, developing written guidelines for addressing the conflicts, seeking advice from
outsiders without these conflicts, arranging for metaevaluations.
The GAGAS states that auditors "should be free of conflicts of interest in
discharging their professional responsibilities" and should be "independent in fact and in
appearance" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 15). The GAGAS makes no
arrangements for dealing with conflicts of interest; it completely forbids conflicts of
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interest. Auditors covered by the GAGAS are mostly government employees who
perform their duties with a degree of independence not usually apparent for evaluators
who work directly for clients. This may explain the differences between the two
approaches to conflicts of interest.
The PES conflict of interest standard, which was not identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation, is not incorporated into
the metaevaluation criteria because of the difficulty in judging the existence of conflicts
from the evaluation report or audit.

P8 Fiscal Responsibility

The PES identifies fiscal responsibility on the part of an evaluator as one of the
eight "propriety" standards. This standard states that an "evaluator's allocation and
expenditure of resources should reflect sound accountability procedures and otherwise be
prudent and ethically responsible, so that expenditures are accounted for and appropriate"
(Joint Committee, 1994, p. 121).
The GAGAS has no standards addressing the fiscal responsibility of auditors in
carrying out their duties. A few standards touch on the issue but none address it as
directly as does the PES. The external impairments standard (3.19a, p. 44) cautions
auditors about factors external to the audit organization that may hinder the objectivity or
independence of an audit. One of these factors mentioned is "external interference or
influence" that could "reduce inappropriately the extent of work performed in order to
reduce costs or fees" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 44). The "quality control and
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assurance" standard (3.51, p. 57) governs an audit organization's internal quality control
system. Among the factors to be considered in implementing this system is "appropriate
cost-benefit considerations" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 57). Finally, the
standard addressing audit recommendations (8.29, p. 170) requires that auditors'
recommendations be, among other things, cost effective.
The PES fiscal responsibility standard, which was not identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation, is not incorporated into
the metaevaluation criteria due to the lack of information concerning audit or evaluation
cost in almost all LPE reports.

Al Program Documentation

This PES standard provides that evaluand be "described and documented clearly
and accurately, so that the program is clearly identified" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 127).
The GAGAS reporting standards for performance audits, under the accurate standard
(General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 174), covers similar ground by requiring "[cjorrect
portrayal" of what is being audited.
Again, the PES is most concerned with the affect accurate description has on the
usefulness of the evaluation to others while the GAGAS is concerned with accuracy
because inaccuracies can damage the credibility of an audit organization.
The PES program documentation standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS accurate standard are
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incorporated into the metaevaluation criteria under "accurate" in the methodology
section.

A2 Context Analysis

On the issue of context, the PES and the GAGAS are in close agreement. The
PES provides that the "context in which the program exists should be examined in
enough detail, so that its likely influences on the program can be identified" (Joint
Committee, 1994, p. 133). The GAGAS "findings" standard (8.13) requires audit reports
to "provide selective background information to provide the context for the overall
message and to help the reader understand the findings and significance of the issues
discussed" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 162).
The PES context analysis standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS findings standard are
incorporated into the metaevaluation criteria under context analysis in the results section.

A3 Described Purposes and Procedures

This PES standard concerns both the objectives, or purposes, of an evaluation and
the procedures used in conducting the evaluation. The A3 standard requires purposes and
procedures to be "monitored and described in enough detail, to that they can be identified
and assessed" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 137). The corresponding GAGAS standard is
objectives, scope, and methodology (8.08). This standard is intended to allow "report

73

users to understand the purpose of the audit and the nature of the audit work performed,
to provide perspective as to what is reported, and to understand any significant limitations
in audit objectives, scope, or methodology" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 160).
Both standards in this case are described as necessary for the end use of an audit
or evaluation to understand and assess the report.
The PES described purposes and procedures standard (identified by the Joint
Committee as particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS
objectives, scope, and methodology standard are incorporated into the metaevaluation
criteria under scope and objectives in the preliminaries section.

A4 Defensible Information Sources

This standard requires the sources of "information used in an evaluation" to be
"described in enough detail, so that the adequacy of the information can be assessed"
(Joint Committee, 1994, p. 141).
The GAGAS does not contain a comparable information sources standard. This
may be because the performance auditing standards place an emphasis on concision. The
report quality elements standard (8.38) requires reports to be "timely, complete, accurate,
objective, convincing, clear, and as concise as the subject permits" (General Accounting
Office, 2003, p. 173). While this standard does require the audit itself to be complete and
accurate, in other words adequate, it does not require the auditor to describe to the report
reader the source of the information.
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The PES defensible information standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) is incorporated into the metaevaluation
criteria under accurate in the methodology section.

A5 Valid Information

This standard, along with the next four standards, concerns information gathered
and analyzed in an evaluation. Together these five standards cover important issues in the
process of gathering and analyzing information for an evaluation. Conducting a
metaevaluation using only an evaluation, or audit, report necessarily limits the criteria
used. None of these five PES standards were identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation and none are incorporated into the
metaevaluation criteria.
The valid information standard requires information gathering procedures to be
developed and implemented to assure that the evaluation's interpretation of the
information is "valid for the intended use" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 145). The PES
includes five elements of the "validation process" (p. 145).
The GAGAS addresses the validity of data in various standards. The standard for
identifying sources of audit evidence (7.31) requires auditors to "consider the validity and
reliability of the data, including data collected by the audited entity, data generated by the
auditors, or data provided by third parties, as well as the sufficiency and relevance of the
evidence" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 143). Another standard, tests of evidence
(7.52a), sets the requirement for the sufficiency of data validity in an audit. An auditor
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should "ensure that enough evidence exists to persuade a knowledgeable person of the
validity of the findings" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 150). Finally, the
convincing standard (8.49) sets the bar for the level of detail about data validity presented
in an audit report. The report should present information that is "sufficient to convince
the report users to recognize the validity of the findings" (General Accounting Office,
2003, p. 176).

A6 Reliable Information

The reliable information standard requires information gathering procedures to be
chosen, developed and implemented to assure the information is "sufficiently reliable for
the intended use" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 153). In assessing the degree of reliability,
evaluators should account for sources of random error and the evaluation's focus, or
target group.
The GAGAS addresses the reliability of data in many of the same standards it
addresses the validity of data. The standard for identifying sources of audit evidence
(7.31) requires auditors to "consider the validity and reliability of the data, including data
collected by the audited entity, data generated by the auditors, or data provided by third
parties, as well as the sufficiency and relevance of the evidence" (General Accounting
Office, 2003, p. 143).
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A 7 Systematic Information

This standard requires evaluators to systematically review information collected
during the evaluation to ensure that errors are found and corrected. "Prudent evaluators
will institute a systematic program of training, controls, and accuracy checks so as to
eliminate as many errors as possible and/or to assess the probable effect of the errors that
are not detected" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 159).
The GAGAS uses the term "quality control process" to cover the same ground as
the PES's systematic information control. The quality control and assurance standard
(3.49) requires audit organizations to have an "appropriate internal quality control system
in place" and to "undergo an external peer review" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p.
56). One quality control process specifically mentioned is referencing. Referencing is "a
process in which an experienced auditor who is independent of the audit verifies that
statements of facts, figures, and dates are correctly reported, that the findings are
adequately supported by the audit documentation, and that the conclusions and
recommendations flow logically from the support" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p.
175).

A8 Analysis of Quantitative Information

Quantitative information should be "appropriately and systematically analyzed so
that evaluation questions are effectively answered" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 165).
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The GAGAS does not make a clear distinction between quantitative and
qualitative information. This may be because the performance auditing field, and the
auditing field in general, do not have the same amount of discussion surrounding the
issue of quantitative versus qualitative methods as the evaluation field does (see Shadish,
1995; Reichardt & Rallis, 1994; and Reichardt & Cook, 1979 ).

A9 Analysis of Qualitative Information

This standard sets the same standard for qualitative information that the previous
standard set for quantitative information, that is qualitative information should be
"appropriately and systematically analyzed so that evaluation questions are effectively
answered" (Joint Committee, 1994, p. 171). As stated above, the GAGAS does not make
a clear distinction between qualitative and quantitative information.

A10 Justified Conclusions

Standard A10 provides that "conclusions reached in an evaluation should be
explicitly justified, so that the stakeholders can assess them" (Joint Committee, 1994, p.
177). The PES cites two reasons for this standard: 1) conclusions that are not justified
may be disregarded by the stakeholders, and 2) conclusions that are not justified
adequately may be incorrect and lead the evaluation's "audience to inappropriate actions"
(p. 177). An evaluation report must include "full information about how the evaluation
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was conducted" and "[w]here possible . . .

[a] discussion of plausible alternative

explanations of the findings and why these explanations were rejected" (p. 177).
Two GAGAS standards address this issue: evidence (7.48) and convincing (8.49).
The convincing standard provides that the "conclusions and recommendations follow
logically from the facts presented" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 176). The link
between a report's justification and the actions of stakeholders is addressed by GAGAS
in a similar way as it is addressed by the PES. Reports that justify their conclusions "help
focus the attention of responsible officials on the matters that warrant attention and can
provide an incentive for taking corrective action" (p. 176). The evidence standard
requires "sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence" to provide a "reasonable basis for
the auditor's findings and conclusions" (p. 149).
The PES justified conclusions standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS evidence and
convincing standards are incorporated into the metaevaluation criteria under defensible in
the methodology section.

A l l Impartial Reporting

This standard requires an evaluator's reporting procedures to "guard against
distortion caused by personal feelings and biases of any party to the evaluation" (Joint
Committee, 1994, p. 181). The evaluator is cautioned to guard against his/her own biases
and also against the biases of those providing information for the evaluation.
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The GAGAS objective standard (8.46) requires the presentation of evidence in an
unbiased manner. The personal impairment standard (3.07) identifies several personal
impairments that may affect an auditor's independence. Among these impairments are
"preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of a
particular program that could bias the audit" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 31).
The PES impartial reporting standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS objective and personal
impairment standards are not incorporated into the metaevaluation criteria due to the
difficulty of judging these standards based solely on the evaluation or audit report.

A12 Metaevaluation

Standard A12 provides that "the evaluation itself should be formatively and
summatively evaluated against these and other pertinent standards" (Joint Committee,
1994, p. 185). The evaluation should be evaluated both by "those who design and carry it
through" and by "external metaevaluators" (p. 185). Specific metaevaluations can help
evaluators "avoid critical mistakes" and the "[rjegular employment of metaevaluations
should enhance the credibility of particular program evaluations and the overall
evaluation profession" (p. 185).
The GAGAS does not use the term metaevaluation but it does have standards that
address a similar process of quality review of performance audit reports. Standard 1.27,
auditor organizations' responsibilities, provides that each audit organization has the
responsibility to ensure that

"an independent peer review is periodically performed
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resulting in an opinion issued as to whether an audit organization's system of quality
control is designed and being complied with to provide reasonable assurance of
conforming with professional standards" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 16). The
quality control and assurance standard (3.49) also requires periodic external peer review.
The PES metaevaluation standard (identified by the Joint Committee as
particularly relevant for reporting an evaluation) and the GAGAS audit organizations'
responsibilities and quality control and assurance standards are incorporated into the
metaevaluation criteria under quality control in the preliminaries section.

Conclusions: PES and GAGAS Standards

Most of the differences between the PES and the GAGAS can be understood by
the differences in audience, creation, and contexts of use.
The main audience for the GAGAS is the professional auditors working in a
government context. The audience for the PES is much broader. Though focused on an
educational context, the intended audience reaches beyond just evaluators to those who
use, read, and fund evaluation reports. This difference leads the PES to be much more
inclusive and receptive to the views of stakeholders beyond the evaluators. The views of
program/agency staff, consumers and other stakeholders are consistently recognized in
the PES. The GAGAS references broader public interests in introductory statements
about an auditor's responsibility but these references are not followed in the text of the
various, specific standards.
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The creation of the PES was a highly collaborative process that arose from
meetings of several educational and professional organizations. While the original
GAGAS, and especially its subsequent revisions, were created with a high degree of
input it was and is at its core a publication of the U.S. government's General Accounting
Office (now the Government Accountability Office). This leads to the GAGAS being
much more focused on the needs and issues of government auditors. The PES, in contrast
was formed to aid not just evaluators but those who are affected by, fund and use
evaluations.
The PES was created within a specific policy area—training and education—
while the GAGAS was created in a broad organizational

area—government

organizations, programs, activities, and functions. However, it is the PES that has broken
beyond its specific policy area to reach into the evaluation of many different programs—
whether government, nonprofit, or business. The GAGAS remains focused on
performance auditing in the government sphere. This shows in the areas of the PES
standards such as stakeholder identification, service orientation, rights of human subjects,
and human interactions where the GAGAS is silent.

Summary and Conclusions

On the topic of state legislative program evaluation, two discoveries stand out
from a review of the literature. First, the terminology varies greatly though over the past
several years the terms performance audit and program evaluation have begun to
predominate. As described above, this study uses the term legislative program evaluation
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(LPE) to refer to all of these activities. Second, the main methodologies employed when
examining LPE is case studies (when looking at LPE reports) and surveys (when looking
at LPE unit staffing and structure)
Only two published papers look directly at a sample of state evaluation-audit
reports. Both of these papers were published during the 1980s (Brown & Craft, 1980;
Brown, 1988). Neither paper uses metaevaluation criteria. Though, Brown and Craft
(1980) do identify several descriptive criteria. This lack of academic attention to LPE
reports is one inspiration for the structure of the current study.
The metaevaluation literature is more extensive, though not voluminous. Ten
published papers apply metaevaluation to multiple evaluation reports (see Table 1, p. 37).
Unlike the current study, only one of these papers selected the reports under study
randomly (Hoogerwerf, 1992). However, nine of the ten papers used only the report itself
to complete the metaevaluation. This study seeks to build on the metaevaluation work of
these previous papers.
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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

A methodology directly examining the products of legislative program
evaluation—the reports themselves—seems to be crucial to get a good idea of what is
actually happening in the field. However, very little of this approach has been
undertaken. Friedberg and Lutrin (2004) conducted searches of academic journals using
several different search engines and found only two recent academic papers concerning
state-level auditing. Funkhouser (2005) also cites the scant literature on performance
auditing. He sets an agenda for scholarly analysis of performance auditing including:
content analysis of actual audit reports, examination of impact of audit organizations, and
an examination of the differences in process, products and results in audit organizations
that arise from different structures. This study concentrates on two of these areas—an
analysis of actual performance audit and evaluation reports and an examination of the
different products (reports) that arise from different organizational structures.

By

focusing on two of Funkhouser's agenda items the study seeks to contribute to the
substantive knowledge of how evaluation is conducted by an important U.S.
governmental sector, state legislatures, on a wide range of issues (education,
transportation, safety, etc.). The study also aims to contribute to the methodology of
evaluation by showing how metaevaluation can be used to assess a large number of
evaluation reports in a setting, field or topic.
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Legislative Program Evaluation Units

State LPE offices were identified starting with the membership of the National
Legislative Program Evaluation Society (NLPES). NLPES is a staff section of the
National Conference of State Legislatures. The NLPES identifies 42 LPE units in 41
different states (VanLandingham, Kinton, Boerner, & Zelio, 2000). Texas has two LPE
units—the State Auditor's Office and the Sunset Advisory Committee. The present study
included only state LPE units that are directly under the control of the legislature. This
includes units where the director is appointed or elected by the legislature, or a committee
of the legislature, and can be removed only by the legislature, not by the state's governor
or another executive branch official. This criterion removed two LPE units (from
California and Oregon). Further states were eliminated because a review of their audits
and reports from 2001 through 2005 showed they were either financial audits or
otherwise not related to performance auditing or evaluation (Alabama, Iowa, North
Carolina, and North Dakota). This left 36 LPE units from 35 states from the members of
NLPES. An investigation of the remaining 15 state legislatures identified five more units
(in California, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Rhode Island) that perform
evaluations, performance audits, or related reviews1. A total of 41 LPE units from 40
states were included in this study (see Appendix B).

1

NLPES lists the Oregon Secretary of State's Audits Division and the California State Auditor as
members. This study includes the Oregon Legislative Fiscal Office as Oregon's LPE unit and the California
Legislative Analyst's Office as California's LPE unit.
2
In 2007 NLPES listed members from 58 units in 49 states. Among the 17 units and 9 states not
represented in this study are 5 units that conduct all fiscal audits, 5 executive branch units, 4 units that
produced no LPE reports from 2001 through 2005, 2 units that were established after 2005, and 1 division
within a LPE unit included in this study.
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All reports (audits, evaluations, sunset reports, and others) from these 41 units
released from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2005 were identified though
reviewing the various unit websites and requesting reports directly from unit staff. Many
of the LPE units also perform financial audits. These financial audits were not included in
the population of reports from which a sample was drawn. A few states conduct
combined financial/performance audits3. These reports were included in the population.
A total of 1,911 reports were identified during the five year period under review.4
Each report was first classified by how it was identified by each unit (i.e. was it
called a performance audit, an evaluation, a review). Then reports were re-classified to
include all types of evaluations (performance evaluations, program evaluations) as simply
evaluations and all types of audits (performance audits, management audits, program
audits, effectiveness audits) as performance audits. Reports referred to as sunset reports
were classified as such. Sunset reports came solely from the states of Alaska (36 reports),
Arizona (1 report), Texas (44 reports), and Washington (1 report). Reports identified by
other names were classified as other. These report names included assessment,
examination, investigation, report, review, study, and survey.
Next a random sample of 100 reports was selected by assigning each report a
random number between zero and one and choosing the 100 lowest numbers for the
sample. The following procedure was used to ensure that the sample included at least one
report from each state LPE unit. The original random sample of 100 reports was
examined to count the number of LPE units represented. LPE units from nine states

3

From 2001 through 2005 Illinois conducted "Financial and Management Audits" and "Financial,
Compliance and Program Audits" while Pennsylvania conducted "Financial and Management Reviews.
4
Reports were identified, collected, and analyzed during 2006. During 2007 this analysis was refined and
completed.
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(Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, Nevada, Oregon,
and Pennsylvania) were not represented in these 100 reports. The report from each of
these nine states with the lowest randomly generated number among that state's reports
was added to the sample, replacing the nine reports with the highest of the original 100
random numbers. These replaced reports came from Georgia (2 reports), Montana, New
Mexico, Texas (Sunset Advisory Commission), Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia (2
reports).
Table 3 shows the characteristics of the population of LPE reports identified for
the five-year period of 2001 through 2005 and the sample selected from this population.
Other reports are slightly overrepresented in the sample while performance audits are
slightly underrepresented. Similarly, one year (2002) is slightly overrepresented while
another year (2001) is slightly underrepresented. As the random sample was stratified by
LPE unit, all 40 states and all 41 LPE units are represented in the sample.

Table 3. Reports Sample and Population.
Report type
Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Report year
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001

Sample (%)
23 (23.0)
25 (25.0)
47 (47.0)
5 (5.0)

Population (%)
344(18.0)
485 (25.4)
1,000(52.3)
82 (4.3)

19(19.0)
19(19.0)
18(18.0)
26 (26.0)
18(18.0)

366(19.2)
371 (19.4)
360(18.8)
410(21.5)
404(21.1)

Finally, a metaevaluation was conducted on all 100 sample reports using criteria
(see Appendix A) adapted by combining elements of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's

Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards for
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performance audits (GAGAS), the Joint Committee on Educational Evaluation's
Program Evaluation Standards (PES), and Scriven's Key Evaluation Checklist (KEC).

Non-legislative Program Evaluation Units

To provide a comparison of different organizational structures non-legislative
program evaluation units (i.e. units that were not under the control of the legislative
branch) were identified that exist in the ten states that did not have a LPE unit issuing
reports during 2001 through 2005 (Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont). Four of these states
(see Table 4) had an executive branch agency issuing performance audit or evaluation
reports during 2001 through 2005.

Table 4. State Non-legislative Program Evaluation Units.
State
North Carolina

Office of the State Auditor

North Dakota

State Auditor

Oklahoma

State Auditor and Inspector

Description
Unit performs mostly financial audits and some
performance audits.
Unit performs mostly financial audits and some
performance audits.
Unit performs mostly financial audits and some
performance audits.

State Auditor

Unit performs mostly financial audits and some
special audits including special reviews, program
assessments and program audits.

Vermont

Non-LPE Unit

These four units issued a total of 53 reports from 2001 through 2005. These 53
reports were classified as either performance audits or other reports. A sample of 10 nonLPE reports was selected using the same procedure described to select the LPE report
sample. Table 5 shows information concerning the non-LPE report population and
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sample. The sample of non-LPE reports was metaevaluated using the same criteria
applied to the LPE report sample.

Table 5. State Non-legislative Program Evaluation Reports.
Report type
Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Report year
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
Report state
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Vermont

Sample (%)
2 (20.0)
0 (0.0)
8 (80.0)
0 (0.0)

Population (%)
18(34.0)
0(0.)
35 (66.0)
0 (0.0)

2 (20.0)
3 (30.0)
1 (10.0)
2 (20.0)
2 (20.0)

13 (24.5)
13 (24.5)
13 (24.5)
10(18.9)
4 (7.5)

4 (40.0)
2 (20.0)
1 (10.0)
3 (30.0)

16(30.2)
7(13.2)
8(15.1)
22(41.5)

Report Recommendations

To investigate the mechanisms by which the various units seek to affect policy
change report recommendations were analyzed. A specific question in this regard is
whether the Louisiana Legislative Auditor used its unique statutory authority to evaluate
""basic assumptions underlying any and all state agencies and the programs and services
provided by the state". (Louisiana Performance Audit Program Act, 1995) A review of
each state's statute that creates and governs its LPE unit revealed Louisiana to be the only
state specifically granting its LPE unit this power to question the legislature's wisdom in
creating an agency or program. Recommendations issued by LPE unit reports, non-LPE
unit reports, and Louisiana reports were analyzed.
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In addition to comparing different

report categories—other,

evaluation,

performance audit, and sunset—LPE unit reports were compared to non-LPE reports.
Reports from the Louisiana LPE unit were also examined separately due to their unique
statutory authority.
All reports were examined for the presence of recommendations. Most reports
include recommendations under a separate heading and number the recommendations. In
this situation separate recommendations were counted according to the numbering system
in the report. In many instances a single numbered recommendations included several
sub-points. However, this set of recommendations was counted as a single
recommendation in keeping with the report's numbering system. Some reports include
unnumbered recommendations. In these instances separate recommendations were
counted based on how they were presented in the text.
Each recommendation was coded as either a recommendation for an executive
agency (an agency recommendation) or a recommendation for the legislature (a
legislative recommendation). Each recommendation was further coded as meeting one or
more of the following criteria: (i) requesting further study of an issue (either by the unit
writing the report, by the legislature, or by some other organization), (ii) requesting a
clarification from the agency or the legislature in the rules or laws concerning the issues
involved, (iii) making a substantive change in the programs, policies, or processes of the
agency involved, (iv) requesting the elimination of a program, agency, duty, or power, or
(v) requesting the consolidation of certain organizations or duties into one or more
entities.
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Louisiana Subsample

To examine the extent to which the Louisiana Legislative Auditor exercised its
statutory authority to evaluate the "basic assumptions underlying any and all state
agencies and the programs and services provided by the state" (Louisiana Performance
Audit Program Act, 1995) a random sample often of the 42 performance audits released
from 2001 through 2005 were metaevaluated using the same metaevaluation criteria
applied to other states' LPE reports and non-LPE reports.

Metaevaluation Criteria

The GAGAS standards are the most commonly applied standards for the reports
produced by the state LPE units (see below). The PES are far less commonly cited but
they are commonly used for metaevaluation in the evaluation literature. (Chatterji, 2005;
Sanders, 1999; Scott-Little, Hamann, & Jurs, 2002)
For both ease of presentation and feasibility of applying metaevaluation criteria to
a large sample of reports three main categories—preliminaries borrowing a term from
Scriven's [2006] Key Evaluation Checklist), methodology, and results—with 16 total
criteria were chosen. The preliminaries section includes criteria for statement of scope
and objectives, identification of values, quality control, statement of standards
compliance, and stakeholder identification. The methodology section includes criteria for
completeness, accuracy, defensibility, human subjects' rights, and comparisons. The
results section includes criteria for context analysis, clarity, concision, findings and
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conclusions, recommendations, and timely. Appendix A shows each of the 16
metaevaluation criteria and descriptions of classifications for excellent, good, fair and
poor.
Some metaevaluation systems (Scott-Little, Hamann, & Jurs, 2002; Stufflebeam,
2000b; Stufflebeam, 2001a; Stufflebeam, 2001b) use more grades than the simple
dichotomy of meets and fails to meet. The ratings system adopted for this study seeks to
add detail to the evaluation of each criterion without creating overly specific categories
that are very difficult to differentiate in practice. In general, excellent and good ratings
can be seen as meeting a criterion. Fair ratings are partially meeting a criterion. Poor
ratings are failing to meet a criterion. Not addressed means a grade for that criterion
cannot be determined from the information presented in the report. However, on some
criteria, a report's failure to address the criterion results in a grade of poor because that
criterion should be addressed in the text of a report (e.g., scope and objectives).
Each report was reviewed by the author, who applied the metaevaluation criteria
and assigned the grades on each of the 16 criteria. Each report was read through first
without assigning grades. During a second reading the author assigned grades for each
criterion and entered justifications for each grade into a spreadsheet. Each report was read
a final time to confirm or change the grades assigned for each criterion. The first and
third readings of each report took approximately 1 hour each. The second readings,
during which grades were assigned, took approximately 3 hours each (including time
spent recording grades and notes on each grade). Reports varied greatly in their lengths,
so these time estimates are averages used to show the approximate amount of time spent
reviewing each report. Report page totals can be deceiving due to the inclusion or
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exclusion of various appendices or supporting data. However, the average page length of
the sample LPE reports was 50.97.

Table 6. Metaevaluation Criteria and Sources.
Metaevaluation
criterion
Scope and
objectives
Values identified

GAGAS

PES

Objectives, scope, and
methodology (8.08)

Described purposes &
procedures (A3)
Values identification (U4)

Preface (Preliminaries II)
Values (Foundations 5)

Metaevaluation (A 12)

Methodology
(Preliminaries III)

Quality control

Audit organizations'
responsibilities (1.27)
Quality control and
assurance (3.49)

Standards
compliance

Statement on GAGAS
compliance (8.30)

Stakeholder
identification

Metaevaluation
(Conclusions and
implications 15)
Stakeholder identification
(Ul)

Complete
Accurate

Complete (8.41)
Accurate (8.43)

Information scope &
selection (U3)
Accuracy (A 1, A4)

Defensible

Evidence (7.48)
Convincing (8.49)

Justified conclusions
(A 10)

Human subjects'
rights

KEC

Rights of human subjects
(P3)

Preface (Preliminaries II)

Metaevaluation
(Conclusions and
implications 15)
Comparisons
(Subevaluations 9)
Preface (Preliminaries II)

Comparisons
Context analysis
Clear
Concise

Evidence (7.50)
Findings (8.13)
Clear (8.50)
Concise (8.53)

Findings and
conclusions

Findings (8.13)
Conclusions (8.27)
Convincing (8.49)

Synthesis (Conclusions and
implications 11)

Recommendations

Recommendations
(8.28)

Recommendations and
explanations (Conclusions
and implications 12)

Timely

Timely (8.39)

Context analysis (A2)
Report clarity (U5)

Report timeliness and
dissemination (U6)
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Table 6 shows the metaevaluation criteria and the corresponding sources for each.
All the PES standards cited above were identified by the Joint Committee as being
particularly important when "reporting the evaluation" (Joint Committee on Standards for
Educational Evaluation [Joint Committee], 1994, p. ix). The absence of a citation to one
of the three sources does not mean that source does not require the criteria, simply that it
is not a specifically stated criterion (for example, there is no specific citation in the Key
Evaluation Checklist to accuracy).
Developing criteria to evaluate an evaluation report necessarily misses some
important aspects of the overall evaluation. Many aspects of the underlying evaluation
are either not fully addressed in the report or cannot be accurately judged by reviewing
just the report. For instance, a report may indicate steps taken to uphold the rights of
human subjects during the course of the evaluation. The contents of the evaluation report
are not sufficient to determine if these steps were actually taken during the course of
conducting the evaluation.
For these reasons, Table 7 shows the 16 metaevaluation criteria and the degree to
which each criterion is able to be accurately assessed based on the evaluation report
alone.
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Table 7. Confidence in Metaevaluation Criteria.
Metaevaluation
criterion

Degree of confidence

Rationale

Scope and
objectives

High

Scope and objectives are easily reported in the evaluation
report

Values identified

Moderate

Values are written about in many ways. Not always
clearly identified. Often implied.

Quality control

Low

Quality control steps can be listed but verifying their use
is impossible using just the report.

Standards
compliance

High

A statement of compliance with standards is easily
reported in the evaluation report.

Stakeholder
identification

Moderate

Stakeholders are written about in many ways. They are
not always clearly identified as stakeholders.

Moderate

Completeness can be judged against the goals of the
report, but it can be difficult to decide if side-effects and
other issues are ignored.

Accurate

Moderate

Accuracy can be checked by agency comments.
However, these comments are not always included and
when included are often only good checks against
negative conclusions.

Defensible

Moderate

Arguments and evidence can be assessed within the
report. However, data often cannot be confirmed.

Moderate

Procedures for addressing human subjects' rights can be
identified in the report, but the evaluators' practices
cannot.

Moderate

Comparative studies and programs/agencies are easily
identified in the report. However, the depth of the
comparison made is often not fully addressed.

Moderate
High

Context provided in reports can be judged but additional
contextual issues that may have been missed cannot be
judged solely using the report.
The clarity of the report can be judged.

Concise

Moderate

Concision of the report can be judged but given the
differences in topic complexity, importance, etc. it is
highly subjective.

Findings and
conclusions

Moderate

Evidence supporting the findings can be judged by the
report, but data often cannot be confirmed.

Recommendations

Moderate

Recommendations can be judged from their presentation
in the report. However, data supporting the
recommendations often cannot be confirmed.

Timely

Low

Information on timeliness is often not included in the
evaluation reports.

Complete

Human subjects'
rights

Comparisons

Context analysis
Clear
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Some of the metaevaluation criteria are useful for evaluating a report in very
limited ways. The accuracy criterion can only be used to confidently determine if a report
is inaccurate in ways unfavorable to program or agency staff. In many reports, these staff
members have the opportunity to comment on the evaluation and to protest errors. It is
likely the staff members will not protest errors that present their program or agency in a
favorable light.
Other criteria only address limited aspects of a report's merit. The scope and
objectives criterion only concerns specificity and provenance of the report's scope and
objectives. This fails to address important topics such as the appropriateness of the
evaluation's scope (too broad or too narrow), the significance of the evaluand (is it worth
the effort used to evaluate it), and the feasibility of the scope of the project given the
resources provided (time, money, staffing).
To develop a metaevaluation scheme that can work for LPE, be replicated across
different sets of reports, and brief enough to be feasible for large samples of reports 16
criteria were chosen, broken into three categories. These criteria were developed to
closely conform to the language from the GAGAS and the PES. Indeed, much of the
specific language reflected in each criterion come from one or both of these sources.
Following is a detailed examination of each criterion highlighting the attributes of reports
graded excellent, good, fair, and poor on each specific criterion.
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Preliminaries

Criteria in this category include statement of scope and objectives, identification
of values, quality control, statement of standards compliance, and stakeholder
identification. These sections of a report introduce the topic under review, identify the
focus areas of the report, and give general guidelines of how the report was conducted.

Statement of Scope and Objectives

The general GAGAS standard for report contents (8.07) requires reports to
include "the objectives, scope, and methodology . . ." (General Accounting Office, p.
160). Points 8.08 through 8.12 further refine what should be included regarding
objectives, scope, and methodology. Objectives should be stated in a "clear, specific, and
neutral manner", "explain why the audit organization undertook the assignment and state
what the report is to accomplish and why the subject matter is important" (p. 160). The
report should "clearly describe the scope of the work performed and any limitations; any
applicable standards that were not followed" and why (p. 161).
Scriven's Key Evaluation Checklist (KEC) notes that the preface is the place to
define "[ejxactly what you're supposed to be evaluating (what's the evaluand)?"
(Scriven, 2006, p. 2) Scriven also suggests the evaluator specify whether she will be
evaluating an entire program, specific dimensions of a program, or just certain
components of the program. All these points hew closely to the GAGAS scope
requirements while they are somewhat related to the objectives requirements.
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These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report lists the specific agency/department and/or activities to be
evaluated/audited. The report lists the specific objectives of the audit/evaluation and how
the objectives were determined (by legislative direction, statute, etc.).
Good: The report lists the specific agency/department and/or activities to be
evaluated/audited. The report lists the specific objectives of the audit/evaluation but not
how the objectives were determined.
Fair: The report specifies the agency/department/activity evaluated or the specific
objectives but not both or lists nonspecific objectives (such as "operating in the public
interest").
Poor: The report fails to specify both the agency/department/activities evaluated/audited
and the objectives.

Identification of Values

The GAGAS do not address values at all. In fact a search of the GAGAS finds not
use of the word "values." The only instances of the word "value" pertains to monetary
values, such as in defining fraud

as obtaining something of value through

misrepresentation.
The PES and the KEC each stress the importance of values.
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report clearly identifies the values used to determine the evaluative
conclusions and how these values were chosen (the source of these values).
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Good: The report clearly identifies the values used to determine the evaluative
conclusions but not how these values were chosen (the source of these values).
Fair: The report implies the values used without clearly identifying them.
Poor: The report fails to address the values used.

Quality Control

The GAGAS includes a standard (3.49) for "quality control and assurance." This
standard specifically addresses the organization performing the audit rather than the
performance of the audit itself. The standard requires each organization to "have an
appropriate internal quality control system in place" and to "undergo external peer
review" (General Accounting Office, p. 56).
The KEC does not use the language of quality control or external peer review.
However, the methodology checkpoint addresses issues such as ensuring the evaluation
team has "adequate domain expertise" through the use of consultants or advisory panels
(Scriven, 2006, p. 2).
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report clearly identifies sufficient internal quality control measures and
external peer reviews conducted of its organization.
Good: The report clearly identifies sufficient internal quality control measures but fails to
identify external peer reviews conducted of its organization.
Fair: The report identifies limited internal quality control measures and no external
organizational reviews.
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Poor: The report identifies no internal quality control measures and no external
organizational reviews.

Statement of Standards Compliance

The GAGAS clearly require that "[ajuditors should report that the audit was made
in accordance with GAGAS" (General Accounting Office, p. 170). There is no
requirement as to the form of this report, but this standard does specify that any specific
standards that were not followed should be reported in the scope section. The KEC
indirectly addresses the use of standards by suggesting the use of the PES in conducting a
metaevaluation.
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report prominently states what standards (PES, GAGAS), if any, guide its
conduct (for example, if there is a methodology section, the standards followed are listed
there as well as in the introduction, summary, or letter of transmittal).
Good: The report states what standards, if any, guide its conduct but do not identify these
standards in the methodology section.
Fair: The report refers to adherence to general professional standards or "government
auditing standards" but does not specify which standards.
Poor: The report does not address standards.

100

Stakeholder Identification

The first PES utility standard (Ul) is "stakeholder identification." This standard
states that "[pjersons involved in or affected by the evaluation should be identified, so
their needs can be addressed" (Joint Committee, p. 25). This standard is particularly
important to evaluation reports as the utility standards as a whole are intended "to ensure
that an evaluation will serve the information needs of intended users" (p. 23).
The KEC, under the preface section, notes that an evaluator should "identify and
define" stakeholders. Stakeholders are defined as "those with a vested interest in the
outcome of the evaluation" (Scriven, 2006, p. 2).
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report clearly identifies stakeholders for the program/agency/policy under
review, including all of the following: consumers of the evaluand, staff working on the
evaluand, decision-makers about the evaluand and funders of the evaluand.
Good: The report clearly identifies stakeholders for the program/agency/policy under
review, including more than one but not all of the following: consumers of the evaluand,
staff working on the evaluand, decision-makers about the evaluand and funders of the
evaluand.
Fair: The report identifies limited stakeholders or identifies only an overly broad group of
stakeholders (e.g. the people to the state).
Poor: The report fails to identify any stakeholders.
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Methodology

This category includes criteria for completeness, accuracy, defensibility, human
subjects' rights, and comparisons. Reports were evaluated on these criteria to judge how
well each report was conducted and how that conduct is reflected in the written report.

Complete

This is the only metaevaluation standard that is taken solely from one of the three
sources, the GAGAS. The applicable GAGAS standard (8.41) requires "that the report
contain all evidence needed to satisfy the audit objectives and promote an adequate and
correct understanding of the matters reported" (General Accounting Office, p. 174).
Report users should be given an "adequate and correct understanding" by "providing
perspective on the extent and significance of reported findings" (p. 174). The subsequent
standard (8.42) provides that "[sufficient detailed supporting data should be included to
make convincing presentations" (p. 174).
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report covers all of the areas it claims to cover in the scope and objectives
sections.
Good: The report covers all but a single small area mentioned in the scope and objectives
section.
Fair: The report covers most areas it claims to cover in the scope and objectives section.
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Poor: The report fails to cover most of the areas it claims to cover in the scope and
objectives section.

Accurate

The GAGAS provides specific standards (8.43, 8.44, and 8.45) concerning
accuracy. Audit reports "should include only information, findings, and conclusions that
are supported by sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence in the audit documentation"
(p. 174). These GAGAS standards also stress the damage the can be done not only the
specific audit containing inaccuracies but also to the organization that produces the audit.
One of the four categories of PES standards is accuracy. Within the twelve
substandards for accuracy are two which are particularly relevant to the metaevaluation
criteria used here. Program documentation (Al) provides that the evaluand "should be
described and documented clearly and accurately, so that the program is clearly
identified" (Joint Committee, p. 127). Defensible information sources (A4) requires
information sources to be "described in enough detail, so that the adequacy of the
information can be assessed" (p. 141).
GAGAS standard 8.31, "Reporting Views of Responsible Officials" (General
Accounting Office, p. 171), requires audits to report the views of those who administer
the program under review. Typically comments are received prior to the final audit being
issued. These comments are included in an appendix to the audit report. These comments
are used to operationalize the accurate criterion for the metaevaluations because checking
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the accuracy of information in each audit was not possible working just from the reports
themselves.
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: Agency comments are included and the agency did not dispute the accuracy of
the information reported.
Good: The agency disputed the accuracy of some information but the report convincingly
rebuts this.
Fair: The agency convincingly disputes the accuracy of some minor information in the
report.
Poor: Agency comments convincingly dispute report's accuracy.

Defensible

The GAGAS evidence standard (7.48) reads: "[sufficient, competent, and
relevant evidence is to be obtained to provide a reasonable basis for the auditors' findings
and conclusions" (p. 149). Concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, standard 7.52(a)
provides that the level of evidence is sufficient if "enough evidence exists to persuade a
knowledgeable person of the validity of the findings" (p. 150). The PES standard
"Justified conclusions" (A10) provides closely related language, stating that an
evaluation's conclusions should be "explicitly justified, so that stakeholders can assess
them" (Joint Committee, p. 177).
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
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Excellent: There was "sufficient, competent and relevant evidence . . . obtained to
provide a reasonable basis for the auditors' findings and conclusions."
Good: There was "sufficient, competent and relevant evidence . , . obtained to provide a
reasonable basis for the auditors' findings" but the overall conclusions go beyond the
individual findings.
Fair: There was competent and relevant information presented but the conclusions go
beyond what that evidence supports.
Poor: There was not sufficient, competent and relevant information presented to provide
a reasonable basis for the findings.

Human Subjects' Rights

One of the four main areas of the PES is propriety. The propriety standards are
designed to "ensure that an evaluation will be conducted legally, ethically, and with due
regard for the welfare of those involved in the evaluation, as well as those affected by its
results" (p. 81). One of the substandards for propriety is "Rights of Human Subjects"
(P3). P3 provides that "[e]valuations should be designed and conducted to respect and
protect the rights and welfare of human subjects" (p. 93).
The KEC briefly touches on this subject by including ethicality among the five
"primary criteria of merit for evaluations" (Scriven, 2006, p. 15).
A caution with the operationalization of this metaevaluation criterion is that is
merely addressing the presence (in the report) of an obvious violation of human subjects'
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rights. Using the reports themselves there is necessarily no good way to determine if the
report's authors respected the rights of human subjects.
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: There is no evidence that the report authors violated subjects rights (disclosed
confidentiality, presented negative information without opportunity for rebuttal, etc.) and
the report identifies procedures designed to ensure the rights of human subjects.
Good: There is no evidence that the report authors violated subjects rights (disclosed
confidentiality, presented negative information without opportunity for rebuttal, etc.).
Fair: There is some evidence that the report authors violated subjects rights (disclosed
confidentiality, presented negative information without opportunity for rebuttal, etc.).
Poor: There is strong evidence that the report authors violated subjects rights (disclosed
confidentiality, presented negative information without opportunity for rebuttal, etc.).

Comparisons

The KEC is the main impetus behind the inclusion of the comparisons criterion.
Comparisons are included as a subevaluation, one of the "five core dimensions" of an
evaluation along with process, outcomes, costs, and generalizability (p. 10). The key to
finding appropriate comparisons is to look for "critical competitors" which are "entities
that are alternative ways of getting the same or similar benefits from about the same
resources" (p. 10). The KEC also presents a point that is especially relevant to LPE units.
In looking for critical competitors "there are also sometimes strong reasons to compare
the evaluand with a demonstrably possible alternative—a "virtual criticomp"—that could
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be assembled from existing or easily constructed components" (p. 10). This does raise
some cautions as this moves the evaluator into "the role of a program designer rather than
evaluator, which creates a risk of conflict of interest" as the evaluator seeks to compare
the original evaluand with a proposed program of her own design, (p. 10)
The GAGAS standards, under evidence (7.50), includes comparisons as a form of
analytical evidence but this standard does not require, or even encourage, the use of
comparisons.
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent:

The

report

competently

addresses

evaluations/audits

of

similar

programs/agencies.
Good: The report refers to evaluations/audits of similar programs/agencies but doesn't
address them fully.
Fair:

The

report

addresses

similar

programs/agencies

but

doesn't

address

evaluations/audits of these programs.
Poor: The report fails to refer to evaluations/audits of similar programs/agencies.

Results

The results section includes criteria for context analysis, clarity, concision,
findings and conclusions, recommendations, and timely. These criteria focus on the merit
of the report as presented. Context analysis is included in this category due to its
importance in determining how well the policy or program under review may be
transferred to different geographic, social, or political contexts.
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Context Analysis

The GAGAS only briefly touch on an evaluand's context. The findings standard
(8.13) provides that an "audit report should provide selective background information to
provide the context for the overall message and to help the reader understand the findings
and significance of the issues discussed" (General Accounting Office, p. 163). Both the
PES and KEC feature context much more prominently.
Context analysis is a separate substandard (A2) under the PES accuracy standard.
This standard provides that the program's context be "examined in enough detail, so that
its likely influences on the program can be identified" (Joint Committee, p. 133).
The KEC addresses context in several places but most specifically under the
preface section of the preliminaries checkpoint. Questions are posed for evaluators to
answer in developing the evaluation. Questions such as: "How much of the context is to
be included? How many of the details are important (enough to replicate the program
elsewhere, enough to recognize it anywhere, or just enough for prospective readers to
know what you're referring to)?" (Scriven, 2006, p. 2).
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report presents the context in which the program/policy/agency exists "in
enough detail, so that its likely influences on the program can be identified."
Good: The report presents the context in which the program/policy/agency exists but does
not address the context's influences.
Fair: The context is presented in insufficient detail.
Poor: The report doesn't present, or only marginally presents, the context.
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Clear

The GAGAS standards include a section regarding report clarity (8.50). This
standard provides that "the report be easy to read and understand," be "prepared in
language as clear and simple as the subject permits," and that "technical terms,
abbreviations, and acronyms . . . should be clearly defined" (General Accounting Office,
p. 176). A subsequent standard provides that "[l]ogical organization of material, and
accuracy and precision in stating facts and in drawing conclusions, are essential to clarity
and understanding" (p. 177).
The PES substandard U5, Report Clarity, provides that reports should "clearly
describe the program being evaluated, including its context, and the purposes,
procedures, and findings of the evaluation, so that essential information is provided and
easily understood" (Joint Committee, p. 49). Like the GAGAS standard for clarity, this
PES standard is linked to the utility of the report.
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report is (1) easy to read and understand, (2) technical terms,
abbreviations and acronyms are explained, and (3) the material is logically organized.
Good: The report is easy to read and understand and logically organized but technical
terms, abbreviations and acronyms are not explained.
Fair: The report is easy to read and understand but is not logically organized and
technical terms, abbreviations and acronyms are not explained.
Poor: The report is not easy to read and understand.
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Concise

GAGAS standard 8.53 provides that "[b]eing concise requires that the report be
no longer than necessary to convey and support the message." This standard also cautions
that "needless repetition should be avoided." These standards are tied to a report's utility
in that reports that "are fact based but concise are likely to achieve greater results"
(General Accounting Office, p. 177).
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report is only as long as is necessary to convey and support conclusions.
Repetition and extraneous detail are avoided.
Good: The report is only as long as is necessary to convey and support conclusions but
includes some repetition and extraneous detail.
Fair: The report is longer than necessary to convey and support conclusions.
Poor: The report includes extensive repetition and/or extraneous detail.

Findings and Conclusions

As findings and conclusions are closely related they are combined in one
metaevaluation criterion here. The GAGAS provides at least three standards directly
related to the findings and conclusions criterion—findings (8.13), conclusions (8.27), and
convincing (8.49). Standard 8.13 ties findings directly to the audit's objectives. Standard
8.27 defines conclusions as "logical inferences about the program based on the auditors*
findings and should represent more than just a summary of the findings." They should be
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"clearly stated, not implied" and they are stronger if they "set up the report's
recommendations and convince the knowledgeable user of the report that action is
necessary" (p. 169). The convincing standard (8.49) further provides ties to the audit's
objectives. An audit is convincing when its results are "responsive to the audit
objectives," its findings are "presented persuasively," and its "conclusions and
recommendations follow logically from the facts presented" (p. 176). Unlike the KEC,
nothing in the GAGAS ties findings or conclusions to consumer/impactee needs.
The KEC addresses findings and conclusions in the synthesis checkpoint under
the conclusions and implications heading. Conclusions should focus on "the present and
future impact on consumer and community needs, subject to the constraints of ethics and
the law, and feasibility, etc." but there usually "should also be some conclusion(s) that
are aimed at the client's and other stakeholders' needs for concise evaluative
information." This requires "referencing the results against their goals, wants, or hopes (if
feasible). . . [b]ut the overarching obligation of the evaluator is to reference the results to
the needs of the impacted population" (Scriven, 2006, p. 11).
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: Findings are supported by credible evidence related to the report's objectives.
Conclusions are reported as "logical inferences from the findings" not simply a
restatement of findings.
Good: Findings are supported, but some conclusions are simply a restatement of findings.
Fair: Findings are supported, but conclusions are mostly a restatement of findings.
Poor: Findings are insufficiently supported and conclusions are mostly a restatement of
findings.
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Recommendations

The GAGAS standard for recommendations (8.28) provides that "[i]f warranted,
auditors should make recommendations for actions to correct problems identified during
the audit and to improve programs and operations." Recommendations should be made
when "the potential for improvement in programs, operations, and performance is
substantiated by the reported findings and conclusions" (General Accounting Office, p.
169-170).
The KEC, under the conclusions and implications section, provides guidance for
possible recommendations and explanations. This checkpoint makes a distinction
between "operational recommendations" which are "those concerning the internal
workings of program management

and equipment

choices/use" and

"macro-

recommendations" which are "about the disposition of the whole program" (Scriven,
2006, p. 12). The former are often easily and appropriately included in evaluations while
the later should only be included if the evaluator has extensive knowledge of the program
decision-makers and "knowledge of all the internal . . . management options available
and the probable outcomes if they are implemented" (p. 12). LPE reports typically
include operational recommendations but often macro-recommendations are also
included. LPE staff members certainly possess extensive knowledge of program decisionmakers (i.e. legislators). Their knowledge of internal management options is less certain.
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: All recommendations presented are specific, measurable, and logically follow
findings and conclusions.
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Good: Most recommendations presented are specific, measurable, and logically follow
findings and conclusions.
Fair: Recommendations logically follow findings and conclusions but are unspecific or
not measurable.
Poor: Recommendations do not logically follow findings and conclusions.

Timely

Timeliness is linked to utility by both the GAGAS and the PES. The GAGAS
standard for timeliness (8.39) provides that "[t]o be of maximum use, the audit report
needs to provide relevant information in time to respond to officials of the audited entity,
legislative officials, and other users' legitimate needs" (General Accounting Office, p.
173). The subsequent standard (8.40) suggests that auditors consider interim reporting on
"significant matters" (p. 173).
The PES utility substandard (U6) concerning report timeliness and dissemination
also stresses the need to issue "[significant interim findings and evaluation reports" to
"intended users" in a "timely fashion" (Joint Committee, p. 53).
These standards were translated to the metaevaluation criteria as follows.
Excellent: The report was completed within the requirement (if any) of the authorization.
Good: The report's time requirement was extended by the report's authorizer and the
report was completed within this extended deadline.
Fair: The report was not completed within the requirements but legitimate reasons are
given for this.
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Poor: The report was not completed with the requirements with no reasonable
explanation.
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CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

This chapter presents findings from the metaevaluation of the legislative program
evaluation reports sample, the metaevaluation of the non-legislative program evaluation
reports sample, and the analysis of the recommendations presented in the legislative
program evaluation report sample, the Louisiana legislative program evaluation reports,
and the non-legislative program evaluation reports sample. An additional section
addresses the comparisons criterion, as that criterion showed the greatest variability of
grades for the sample LPE reports.

LPE Metaevaluations

Overall, the LPE reports fared very well against the metaevaluation criteria.
Given that the criteria were drawn largely from both the GAGAS and PES this is not
surprising. Fifty-five percent of reports specified that they were conducted in accordance
with the GAGAS.5 An additional eight percent cited unspecified governmental auditing
standards. While four percent cited "applicable evaluation standards" no reports
specifically cited the PES.6 The remaining thirty-seven percent of the reports did not cite
any standards.

5

One of these reports, from Illinois, cited both the GAGAS and Illinois Auditor General standards.
All of these reports were from Florida's Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability (OPPAGA). OPPAGA's website cites the PES as the standards followed for research
conducted by their office (see http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/about.html).
6
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Table 8. LPE Reports Sample: Standards Cited.
Report type
Other (23 total)
Evaluation (25 total)
Performance audit (47 total)
Sunset (5 total)

GAGAS (%)
8 (34.8)
3 (12.0)
43(91.5)
1 (20.0)

Unspecified Standards (%)
0 (0.0)
5 (20.0)
2 (4.3)
1 (20.0)

None(%)
15(65.2)
17(68.0)
2 (4.3)
3 (60.0)

Table 8 shows the breakdown of the standards cited in sample LPE reports by
classification of each report (other, evaluation, performance audit, or sunset). As one
might expect, a high percentage, 91.5 percent, of the performance audits cited the
GAGAS. Almost thirty-five percent of reports classified as other also cited the GAGAS
while a small percentage, 12 percent, of evaluations cited the GAGAS.

Preliminaries

The preliminaries criteria saw general agreement across the four report
categories—other, evaluation, performance audit, and sunset. Majorities of all report
types were graded excellent on the scope and objectives and stakeholders criteria, fair on
the values criterion, and poor on the quality control criterion.
A strong majority, 78.7 percent, of performance audits were graded excellent on
the standards identification criterion. Over two-thirds of evaluations were graded poor on
this criterion. A fifth of evaluations partially met this criterion by referencing general
standards but not specifying which standards. Slightly less than five percent of
performance audits referenced unspecified standards. Table 9 shows the ratings for all
three report types on the preliminaries criteria.
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Table 9. LPE Metaevaluation Ratings: Preliminaries.
Report type

S&O (%)

Values (%)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

19 (82.6)
22 (88.0)
26(55.3)
3 (60.0)
70 (70.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
1 (2.1)
1 (20.0)
2 (2.0%)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

3(13.0)
2 (8.0)
20 (42.6)
1 (20.0)
26 (26.0)

2(8.7)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
2 (2.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0 (0.0)
1 (4.0)
0 (0.0)
1 (20.0)
2 (2.0)

20 (87.0)
24 (96.0)
46 (97.9)
4 (80.0)
94 (94.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

1 (4.3)
0 (0.0)
1 (2.1)
0 (0.0)
2 (2.0)

1 (4.3)
1 (4.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
2 (2.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

Standards (%)
QC (%)
Excellent
0 (0.0)
5 (21.7)
3 (12.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
37 (78.7)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
45 (45.0%)
0 (0.0%)
Good
0 (0.0)
3(13.0)
2 (8.0)
0 (0.0)
8(17.0)
6(12.8)
1 (20.0)
0 (0.0)
10(10.0)
10(10.0)
Fair
0 (0.0)
1 (4.3)
5 (20.0)
0 (0.0)
2 (4.3)
2 (4.3)
0 (0.0)
1 (20.0)
3 (3.0)
8 (8.0)
Poor
22 (95.7)
15(65.2)
23 (92.0)
17(68.0)
37 (78.7)
2 (4.3)
5 (100.0)
3 (60.0)
87 (87.0)
37 (37.0)
Not applicable
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Stakeholders (%)
17 (73.9)
21 (84.0)
40(85.1)
3 (60.0)
81 (81.0)
2 (8.7)
2 (8.0)
3 (6.4)
0 (0.0)
7 (7.0)
3(13.0)
2 (8.0)
4(8.5)
2 (40.0)
11 (11.0)
1 (4.3)
0 (0.0)
0 (0,0)
0 (0.0)
1 (1.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Note. S&O = scope and objectives; QC = quality control.

Methodology

Three criteria under the methodology section—complete, defensible and rights of
human subjects—were overwhelmingly graded excellent or good (see Table 10).
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Table 10. LPE Metaevaluation Ratings: Methodology.
Report type

Complete (%)

Accurate (%)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

22 (95.7)
24 (92.0)
46 (97.9)
4 (80.0)
95 (95.0)

12 (52.2)
16(64.0)
36 (76.6)
1 (20.0)
65 (65.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0 (0.0)
1 (4.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
1 (1.0)

2 (8.7)
1 (4.0)
6(12.8)
1 (20.0)
10(10.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0 (0.0)
1 (4.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
1(1.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0
0
0
0
0

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

1 (4.3)
0 (0.0)
1 (2.1)
1 (20.0)
3 (3.0)

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

9(39.1)
8 (32.0)
5(10.6)
3 (60.0)
25 (25.0)

Defensible (%)
Excellent
23 (100.0)
25 (100.0)
46 (97.9)
5 (100.0)
99 (99.0)
Good
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Fair
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Poor
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Not applicable
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
1 (2.1)
0 (0.0)
1(1.0)

Rights (%)
0
0
0
0
0

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

23 (100.0)
25 (100.0)
47(100.0)
5 (100.0)
100(100.0)

Compare (%)
3(13.0)
11 (44.0)
6(12.8)
1 (20.0)
21 (21.0)
0 (0.0)
2 (8.0)
2 (4.3)
2 (40.0)
6 (6.0)

0
0
0
0
0

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

5(21.7)
12 (48.0)
21 (44.7)
1 (20.0)
36(36.0)

0
0
0
0
0

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

15(65.2)
0 (0.0)
18(38.3)
1 (20.0)
37(37.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0
0
0
0
0

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

Note. Rights = rig;hts of human subjects; compare = comparisons

Large majorities of all report types were graded excellent or good on the accuracy
criterion. A fourth of all reports were judged not applicable on this criterion due to the
reports lack of comments from the evaluated agency or department. Many of these
reports were of the variety that would not lend them to including agency or department
comments (such as best practice reviews or evaluations of overarching policy areas).
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The comparisons criterion saw the reports fairly evenly distributed with about a
third scoring excellent or good (27 percent), about a third fair (36 percent), and about a
third poor (37 percent). Over half of the evaluations, 52 percent, were graded excellent or
good on this criterion while no evaluations were graded poor. In comparison, less than a
fifth, 17.1 percent, of performance audits were graded excellent or good on comparisons
while more than a third, 38.3 percent, were graded poor.

Results

The context, clarity, concision, findings and conclusions, and recommendations
criteria all were graded almost universally excellent or good (see Table 11). Over ninety
percent of all reports were not able to be evaluated on the timely criterion because
information regarding requirements for completing the report was not presented. All
reports that did include enough information to evaluate timeliness were graded excellent.

Discussion

Overall, the metaevaluation results show strong adherence to the criteria. Five of
the six criteria in the results category (context, clear, concise, findings and conclusions,
and recommendations), three of the five criteria in the methodology category (complete,
defensible, and rights), and one of the criteria in the preliminaries category (scope and
objectives) saw over 90 percent of reports graded as excellent or good.
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Table 11. LPE Metaevaluation Ratings: Results.
Context (%)

Clear (%)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

18(78.3)
24 (96.0)
36 (76.6)
4 (80.0)
82 (82.0)

21 (91.3)
25 (100.0)
43(91.5)
5 (100.0)
94 (94.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

1 (4.3)
0 (0.0)
10(21.3)
1 (20.0)
12(12.0)

2 (8.7)
0 (0.0)
4 (8.5)
0 (0.0)
2 (2.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

2 (8.7)
0 (0.0)
1 (2.1)
0 (0.0)
4 (4.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

2 (8.7)
1 (4.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
2 (2.0)

0
0
0
0
0

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0
0
0
0
0

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Report type

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

F&C (%)
Concise (%)
Excellent
23 (100.0)
23 (100.0)
25 (100.0)
24 (96.0)
47 (100.0)
45 (95,7)
2 (40.0)
5 (100.0)
97 (97.0)
97 (97.0)
Good
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Fair
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
3 (60.0)
0 (0.0)
3 (3.0)
1 (1.0)
Poor
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
1(2.1)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Not applicable
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
1 (4.0)
1 (2.1)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0 .0)
2 (2.0)

Rec. (%)

Time (%)

21 (91.3)
22 (88.0)
42 (89.4)
5 (100.0)
90 (90.0)

2(8.7)
0 (0.0)
3 (6.4)
4 (80.0)
9 (9.0)

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

0(0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0(0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0
0
0
0
0

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0
0
0
0
0

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

2(8.7)
3(12.0)
5(10.6)
0 (0.0)
10(10.0)

21 (91.3)
25(100.0)
44(93.6)
1 (20.0)
91 (91.0)

Note. F&C = findings and conclusions; Rec. = recommendations; Time = timely.

Several of these criteria—clear, concise, complete, accurate and defensible—were
difficult to grade. Though the reports as a group deserved high ratings, the difficulty of
objectively rating these categories across reports should not be underestimated (especially

for the complete, accurate and defensible criteria). The clear and concise criteria were
somewhat easier to apply.
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Other areas on which a high percentage of reports were graded excellent or
good—scope and objectives, context, findings and conclusions, and recommendations—
entailed more specific rules for application. Therefore the findings for these criteria
should be given greater confidence.
The remaining high scoring criteria—rights of human subjects (100 percent of
reports graded good) and the accurate criterion (on which 75 percent or reports were
graded excellent or good with the remaining 25 percent not applicable)—both entail rules
that lend them to asymmetrical evaluation. A report met the accurate criterion if it did not
contain an objection to its accuracy in the agency comments to the report. Agencies that
received erroneous favorable findings would be unlikely to object. Therefore this
criterion, as applied in this study, could only be credibly said to have judged if the LPE
report was inaccurate in the negative direction, not the positive. The human subjects
criterion was judged as met if a report did not include evidence of violating the rights of
human subjects. This would obviously miss reports that violated human subjects' rights
but did not include evidence of this violation in the report. These two criteria are
especially troublesome when conducting a metaevaluation solely on the final report.
Though the time criterion is very important forjudging the value of LPE reports,
the lack of information provided in the actual text of the reports did not allow for an
accurate review for 91 percent of the reports. This criterion came directly from the
GAGAS performance auditing standards. It is likely that the LPE reports are being
completed in a timely manner, but the reports themselves are not specifying this.
This analysis of the metaevaluations highlights a few interesting differences
between performance audits and evaluations. Performance audits were much more likely
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to be graded excellent or good on the standards criteria (91.5 percent) than were the
evaluations (12 percent). This suggests that performance auditors are more professionally
linked to the GAGAS than evaluators are linked to the PES or other evaluation standards.
Evaluations were more likely to be graded excellent or good on the comparisons criteria
(52 percent) than were performance audits (14.9 percent). Finally, on the quality control
criteria 78.7 percent of performance audits versus 92 percent or evaluations were graded
poor. This criterion was judged by the presence or absence, in a report, of internal quality
control measures and any external peer reviews. Again, this may be a case of LPE units
following good quality control procedures but not specifying them in their final reports.

Comparisons

As discussed above, the comparisons criterion showed the most variability for the
LPE reports. The discussion below explores these differences further and also contrasts
the performance of the LPE reports with the performance of the non-LPE reports on the
comparisons criterion.
Among the LPE reports, evaluations fared far better on the comparisons criterion
than did performance audits, sunset reports or other reports. No evaluations were graded
poor, while 38.3 percent of performance audits and 65.2 percent of other reports did.
Several caveats apply to the discussion of comparisons in LPE reports. The
metaevaluation criterion for comparisons only looks at what type of comparative studies
were cited, not how well they were used, how closely they fit the situation in the extant
evaluation, or how methodologically sound was the comparative study being cited.
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Table 12. LPE Reports Using Comparisons.

Report type

Comparisons (%)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

3(13.0)
11 (44.0)
6(12.8)
1 (20.0)
21(21.0)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0 (0.0)
2 (8.0)
2 (4.3)
2 (40.0)
6 (6.0)

Cites specific state
Cites comparison
in objectives (:%)
LPE report(s) (%)
Excellent
1 (33.3)
1 (33.3)
3 (27.3)
2(18.2)
2 (33.3)
2(33.3)
0 (0.0)
1 (100.0)
6 (28.6)
6 (28.6)
Good
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0
0
0
0

(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

Cites national or
nonspecific state
report(s) (%)
2 (66.7)
9(81.8)
5(83.3)
1 (100.0)
17(81.0)

2(100.0)
2(100.0)
2(100.0)
6(100.0)

Table 12 shows the LPE reports that were graded excellent or good on the
comparisons criterion. Twenty-seven percent of LPE reports achieved these grades. The
remaining seventy-three percent of reports were graded either poor (i.e., they did not
include any reference to similar programs/agencies or to audits or evaluations of similar
programs or agencies) or fair (the report addressed similar programs/agencies but did not
address evaluations or audits of these programs/agencies). The table identifies, by report
types, whether the report's objectives specifically call for a comparative examination of
the program/agency, whether the report cites a specific LPE report or reports from other
states, and whether the report cites national or nonspecific LPE reports. A few reports
cited both specific LPE reports from other states and national reports concerning the
program/agency under review.
A minority (28.6 percent) of the reports that were graded excellent contained
objectives that specifically called for a comparative review. While none of the six reports
scoring good called for a comparative review in their objectives. Similarly, 28.6 percent
of reports scoring excellent cited specific LPE reports (evaluations, audits, etc.) from
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other states. No reports that were graded good cited specific LPE reports. The vast
majority of excellent reports (81 percent) and all of the good reports cited national studies
or nonspecific state studies.
Table 13 shows the ratings on the comparisons criteria for the LPE reports and the
non-LPE reports. The majority of reports in each category (non-LPE and LPE) were
judged fair or poor. However, 28 percent of LPE reports were graded excellent or good
while only one of the ten non-LPE reports was graded good.

Table 13. Comparisons Criterion: Non-LPE Versus LPE Reports.
LPE comparisons (%)

Non-LPE comparisons (%)
Excellent
Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0 (0.0)

3(13.0)
11 (44.0)
6(12.8)
1 (20.0)
21 (21.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Good

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0 (0.0)
2 (8.0)
2 (4.3)
2 (40.0)
6 (6.0)

0 (0.0)
1 (12.5)
1 (10.0)
Fair

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

5(21.7)
12 (48.0)
21(44.7)
1 (20.0)
36 (36.0)

1 (50.0)
5 (62.5)
6 (60.0)
Poor

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

15(65.2)
0 (0.0)
18(38.3)
1 (20.0)
36(36.0)

1 (50.0)
2 (25.0)
3 (30.0)
Not applicable

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

0
0
0
0
0

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
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(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)

Legislative Versus Non-legislative Program Evaluation Units

This section examines legislatively based program evaluation units and similar
units located in the executive branch of state governments. Non-legislative program
evaluation units that exist in the ten states that did not have a LPE unit issuing reports
during 2001 through 2005 were identified (Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont). Four of
these states (see Table 3, p. 87) had an executive branch agency issuing performance
audit or evaluation reports during 2001 through 2005.
These four units issued a total of 53 reports from 2001 through 2005. These 53
reports were classified as either performance audits or other reports (see Table 4, p. 88).
A sample of 10 non-LPE reports was selected using the same procedure described to
select the LPE report sample. The sample of non-LPE reports was metaevaluated using
the same criteria applied to the NPE report sample. Tables 14, 15, and 16 show the
metaevaluation ratings for the non-LPE report sample.

Preliminaries

The preliminaries criteria saw general agreement across the two report
categories—other and performance audit—although the small number of other reports
makes across category comparisons difficult. Majorities of all non-LPE reports were
graded excellent on the scope and objectives, standards, and stakeholder criteria, fair on
the values criterion, and poor on the quality control criterion. These results are similar to
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the results for the LPE reports. The only difference was seen on the standards criteria.
While 90 percent of the non-LPE reports were graded excellent on this criterion, only 45
percent of LPE reports were graded excellent (see Table 9, p. 117). Table 14 shows the
ratings for both report types on the preliminaries criteria.

Table 14. Non-LPE Metaevaluation Ratings: Preliminaries.
S&O (%)

Values (%)

Other
Performance audit
Total

1 (50.0)
7(87.5)
8 (80.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit

1 (500)
1 (12.5)
20 (20.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

2 (100.0)
8(100.0)
10(100.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Total

QC (%)
Standards (%)
Excellent
0 (0.0)
1 (50.0)
0 (0.0)
8(100.0)
0 (0.0)
9 (90.0)
Good
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Fair
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Poor
2(100.0)
1 (50.0)
8(100.0)
0 (0.0)
10(100.0)
1 (10.0)
Not applicable
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Stakeholders (%)
2(100.0)
8(100.0)
10(100.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Note. S&O = scope and objectives; QC = quality control.

Methodology

Table 15 presents the results for non-LPE reports on the methodology criteria.
Three criteria under the methodology section—complete, accurate, and defensible—were
uniformly graded excellent.
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The two reports classified as other were graded good on the rights criterion while
the eight performance audits were graded fair on that criterion.
The comparisons criterion saw the reports distributed among the good, fair, and
poor ratings. One other report was graded fair and one poor. Five of the eight
performance audits were graded fair, one graded good, and the remaining two graded
poor.
There were virtually no differences between the LPE and non-LPE reports on the
complete and defensible criteria. Both were graded very highly on each. On the accurate
criterion, the non-LPE reports all were graded excellent while the 65 percent of the LPE
reports were graded excellent. A quarter of the LPE reports were not graded on the
accuracy criterion because they did not include comments from the agency/office under
review. All of the non-LPE reports included agency comments.
On the comparisons criterion, 22 percent of LPE reports were graded excellent
while no non-LPE reports were graded excellent. This difference may be explained in
part by the absence of evaluations among the non-LPE reports. Forty-four percent of the
LPE evaluations were graded excellent.

Results

Ratings on the results criteria were very similar for non-LPE and LPE reports.
The context, clarity, concision, findings and conclusions, and recommendations criteria
all were graded almost universally excellent or good. Almost all non-LPE and LPE
reports were not able to be evaluated on the timely criterion because information
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Table 15. Non-LPE Metaevaluation Ratings: Methodology.

Complete (%)

Accurate (%)

Other
Performance audit
Total

2 (100.0)
8 (100.0)
10(100.0)

2 (100.0)
8 (100.0)
10(100.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Defensible (%)
Excellent
2(100.0)
8 (100.0)
10(100.0)
Good
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Fair
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Poor
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Not applicable
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Rights (%)

Compare (%)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

2 (100.0)
0 (0.0)
2 (20.0)

0 (0.0)
1 (12.5)
1 (10.0)

0 (0.0)
8(100.0)
8 (80.0)

1 (50.0)
5 (62.5)
6 (60.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

1 (50.0)
2 (25.0)
3 (30.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Note. Compare = comparisons.

regarding requirements for completing the report was not presented. The single report
that did include enough information to evaluate timeliness was graded excellent. Table 16
shows ratings for the non-LPE reports on the results criteria.
Table 17 shows the breakdown of the standards cited in sample non-LPE reports
by classification of each report (other, evaluation, performance audit, or sunset). Nine out
of the ten performance audits cited the GAGAS. One of two reports classified other also
cited the GAGAS. The remaining report did not cite any standards. None of the sample,
or population, non-LPE reports were evaluations or sunset reports.
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Table 16. Non-LPE Metaevaluation Ratings: Results.
Context (%)

Clear (%)

Other
Performance audit
Total

1 (50.0)
6 (75.0)
7 (70.0)

2(100.0)
8(100.0)
10(100.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

1 (50.0)
2 (20.0)
3 (30.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Other
Performance audit
Total

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Concise (%)
F&C (%)
Excellemt
2(100.0)
2(100.0)
8(100.0)
8(100.0)
10(100.0)
10(100.0)
Good
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Fair
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Poor
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
Not applicable
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Rec. (%)

Time (%)

2 (100.0)
8(100.0)
10(100.0)

0 (0.0)
1 (12.5)
1 (10.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

2(100.0)
7 (87.5)
9 (90.0)

Note. F&C = findings and conclusions; Rec. = recommendations; Time = timeliness.

Table 17. LPE Reports Sample: Standards Cited.
Report type
Other (2 total)
Evaluation (0 total)
Performance audit (8 total)
Sunset (0 total)

GAGAS (%)
1 (50.0)
0 (0.0)
8(100.0)
0 (0.0)

Unspecified standards (%)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

None (%)
1 (50.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

Report Recommendations

Table 18 shows information concerning recommendations in the LPE reports. As
a whole, the LPE reports are more likely to contain recommendations for the agency
under review (75 percent of reports) than for the legislature (43 percent of reports). This
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difference was reflected in all report types except for sunset reports. This should be
expected because sunset reports are specifically designed to report to the legislature on
whether, and in what form, an agency should be reauthorized. Conversely, performance
audits were the report type most likely to contain agency recommendations (85.1 percent
of reports) and least likely to contain legislative recommendations (29.8 percent of
reports). This follows from the GAGAS requirements which do not address legislative
recommendations but deal extensively with agency recommendations.

Table 18. LPE Reports with Recommendations.
Report type
Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

Reports
(%)
No rec.
2 (8.7)
6 (24.0)
6(12.8)
0 (0.0)
14(14.0)

Reports
Rec. per
report
(%)
Agenc> rec.
16 (69.9)
4.6
17 (68.0)
6.8
40(85.1)
9.6
2 (40.0)
2.5
75 (75.0)
7.7

Reports
Rec. per
report
(%)
Leg. rec.
14(60.9)
1.9
11 (44.0)
1.8
14 (29.8)
2.9
14.0
4 (80.0)
43 (43.0)
3.3

Reports
Rec. per
(%)
report
Both
9(39.1)
7.4
9(36.0)
8.2
13 (27.7)
12.4
1 (20.0)
26.0
32(32.0)
10.2

Note. Rec. = recommendations; leg. = legislative.
Table 19 concerns recommendations in non-LPE reports. As with the LPE
reports, these reports are much more likely to contain agency recommendations (92.5
percent of reports) than to contain legislative recommendations (49.1 percent of reports).
Among the non-LPE reports, performance audits (57.1 percent of reports) are more likely
than other reports (33.3 percent of reports) to contain legislative recommendations.
All Louisiana reports arc performance audits. Almost all these reports contain

agency recommendations (95.2 percent of reports) and two-thirds contain legislative
recommendations. Only 4.8 percent of reports contain no recommendations.
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Table 19. Non-LPE Reports with Recommendations.
Report type
Other
Performance audit
Total

Reports
(%)
No rec.
1 (5.5)
2 (5.7)
3 (5.7)

Reports
Rec. per
(%)
report
Agency rec.
17(94.4)
10.5
32(91.4)
13.9
49 (92.5)
12.7

Reports
Rec. per
report
(%)
Leg. rec.
6 (33.3)
2.3
2.2
20(57.1)
2.2
26(49.1)

Reports
Rec. per
(%)
report
Agency & leg rec.
6(33.3)
14.5
19(54.3)
16.4
25(47.2)
16.0

Note. Rec. = recommendations; leg. = legislative.
Interestingly, 14 percent of LPE reports contained a recommendation to eliminate
an agency or program while no non-LPE reports and no Louisiana LPE reports contained
such a recommendation. This situation is certainly influenced by the presence of sunset
reports in the LPE sample while the non-LPE reports and Louisiana reports do not
included sunset reports. However, three of the fourteen performance audit LPE reports
(21.4 percent) also contain a recommendation for elimination.
Recommendations for consolidation of programs and agencies are slightly more
common among LPE reports than non-LPE and Louisiana reports. Almost all types of
reports contained at least one report with a consolidation recommendation. The exception
was the category of other non-LPE reports.
Non-LPE reports (30.8 and 23.1 percent) and Louisiana reports (21.4 and 42.9
percent) were slightly more likely than LPE reports (16.3 and 20.9 percent) to
recommend further study or a clarification of the law.
Comparisons between LPE reports and non-LPE reports disclosed no great
differences.

Large majorities of all reports from these three groups contain

recommendations. LPE reports were only slightly more likely to address their
recommendations to the legislature than were non-LPE reports. There was also a small
difference in the frequency of recommendations for program or agency elimination. LPE
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were more likely than non-LPE reports to recommend elimination. One might surmise
that one executive branch agency would be unlikely to recommend the elimination of
another executive branch agency. Legislative agencies may have less hesitation in this
regard.
Table 20 shows the types of legislative recommendations for LPE reports, nonLPE reports, and Louisiana LPE reports. The number listed for each category indicates
the number of reports that contained a recommendation of the type specified. Reports
could contain recommendations of several different types.

Table 20. LPE, Non-LPE, and Louisiana Reports: Recommendations.
Further study
(%)

Clarify (%)

Consolidate
(%)

Other
Evaluation
Performance audit
Sunset
Total

3(21.4)
2(18.2)
1 (7.1)
1 (25.0)
7(16.3)

1 (7.1)
1 (9.1)
5 (35.7)
2 (50.0)
9 (20.9)

1(7.1)
1(9.1)
2(14,3)
3 (75.0)
7(16.3)

Other
Performance audit
Total

1 (16.7)
7 (35.0)
8 (30.8)

2(33.3)
4 (20.0)
6(23.1)

Performance audit

6(21.4)

12(42.9)

Report type

Substantive
Eliminate
change(%)
(%)
LPE reports
12 (85.7)
0 (0.0)
10(90.9)
0 (0.0)
13 (92.9)
3 (21.4)
4 (100.0)
3 (75.0)
39 (90.7)
6(14.0)
Non-LPE reports
5 (83.3)
0 (0.0)
17(85.0)
0 (0.0)
22 (84.6)
0 (0.0)
Louisiana LPE reports
23 (82.1)
0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)
3(15.0)
3(11.5)
3 (10.7)

One prominent difference between LPE and non-LPE reports was the absence of
evaluations among the non-LPE reports. Perhaps as a consequence, the non-LPE reports
were more likely to cite the GAGAS as their governing standards. The small population
of reports and states with non-LPE units makes it difficult to draw wider conclusions
from these comparisons with the LPE reports.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This study set out to describe how U.S. state legislative staffs conduct
evaluations. The study addressed the ubiquity of state LPE units, the standards those units
follow, the recommendations that LPE reports proffer, and the quality of the reports on
several criteria. In the process of this investigation there was an examination of the
feasibility of using metaevaluation to evaluate a large number of reports using solely the
information contained in the reports themselves.

LPE Units and Reports

Forty of the fifty U.S. state legislatures had a LPE unit that published at least one
legislative program evaluation report during the five-year period covered in the study.
One state, Texas, had two such units (see Appendix B). Four of the ten states without
LPE units within their respective legislatures had executive branch evaluation or
performance audit units (see Table 3, p. 87).
State LPE units, and consequently the reports they produce, are overwhelmingly
more connected to performance auditing and the GAGAS than to evaluation and
evaluation standards (whether the Joint Committee Standards or the AEA's Guiding
Principles for Evaluators). Approximately half of LPE reports are identified as
performance audits while only a quarter are identified as evaluations (Table 4, p. 88).
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Over half the reports cited the GAGAS as their governing standards while none
specifically cited the PES or the AEA's Guiding Principles (Table 8, p. 116).
This heavy reliance on the GAGAS can be explained due to the emergence of
state legislative program evaluation largely from the financial auditing units already
existing in state legislatures. Also, the GAGAS are the official standards for government
auditing while the PES are not. Still, given the influence of the field of evaluation on
legislative program evaluation as seen by the choice of the name for the premier
professional group of these state units—the National Legislative Program Evaluation
Society—one would expect more explicit reference to evaluation standards.
State LPE reports direct most of their recommendations toward the agencies or
office they are evaluating instead of toward the state's legislators (see Table 18, p. 131).
Performance audits are slightly more likely than evaluations to offer recommendations to
agencies while evaluations are slightly more likely than performance audits to direct their
recommendations to the legislature. They types of recommendations offered by
performance audits and evaluations did not differ much though performance audits where
slightly more likely to recommend program or agency elimination or consolidation.
Applying the metaevaluation criteria to the LPE reports resulted in consistently
high grades, across all four report categories, on most criteria. Two criteria on which
performance audits and evaluations differed markedly were standards cited and
comparisons.
Performance audits were highly likely to cite the standards under which the report
was produced while evaluations very rarely cited applicable standards (see Table 8, p.
116). Like many differences between performance audits and evaluations this may be a
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result of the auditing culture that took root in financial audits and migrated to
performance audits. The standards cited were predominately the GAGAS with a low
percentage of reports citing unspecified standards.
The use of comparisons in the LPE reports was an interesting finding that saw a
great deal of variation among the different report types and even among different reports
of the same type. Roughly a third of all LPE reports were graded excellent or good on
the comparisons criterion. Another third of reports were graded fair. The final third was
graded poor—reflecting no mention of comparisons in the report (see Table 10, p. 118).
Evaluations were more likely to be graded excellent or good on this criterion than were
performance audits.
The examination of comparisons should be of paramount importance to legislative
program evaluation. Legislatures allocate resources among the competing needs within
their jurisdictions. They need rigorous examination of the choices they have made, and
the choices they could make. LPE units could provide much more of this type of
information to their respective legislatures. In addition to providing evaluations focused
on the specific goals and objectives of each program or policy under review, LPE units
could expand their reviews to include examinations of different ways to meet the same
needs.
Some state LPE units accomplish this through best practice reviews or policy
briefs. These reports usually do not focus on a particular, existing program or policy;
rather they look at a problem or need and examine different options for addressing it. The
concept of examining best practices could be incorporated into performance audit and
evaluation reports on a smaller scale. Each performance audit or evaluation could include
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a section highlighting best practices and comparing the program or policy under review
to the identified best practices.
Such a step could aid legislatures in modifying and designing policy. It would
also facilitate the transfer of successful policies and programs from one jurisdiction to
another as each state would constantly be examining how other states address similar
needs. A comparative or best practices approach would most likely need to be proposed
by a state legislature, through statute, or by a legislative committee overseeing an LPE
unit. LPE units currently adhere closely to legislative direction when pursuing their
reports.
The LPE reports, especially the performance audits, are very goal-directed. The
objectives for the report are laid out clearly—as required by the GAGAS—and the
reports seldom stray beyond addressing topic suggested when the report is requested.
Among reports graded good or excellent on the comparisons criterion report objectives
seldom contained specific instructions to compare the agency or program under review to
either a different approach from another state or to a different idea for addressing the
same needs the program or policy under review was designed to address (see Table 13, p.
125). Several reports ventured beyond the specific call of their objectives and
investigated comparisons. If more organizations that, and people who, commission these
reports (legislative commissions, legislative committees, and LPE unit leaders)
specifically call for comparative explorations these explorations will certainly increase.
The format of LPE reports, while varying across the different states and units, is
similar enough that it leads to greater ease of comparing reports than would likely be the
case trying to compare evaluation reports in general. This consistency of style is likely a
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product of the GAGAS, given its wide use in the LPE reports sample. The PES also
contain a standard (the program documentation standard—Al) that stresses the
importance of program documentation for enabling comparisons with other programs. So
there is some recognition of the importance of comparisons in the GAGAS and the PES
this is an area where each could borrow from Scriven's KEC.

Metaevaluation

In addition to exploring the specific area of state legislative program evaluation
reports, this study also sought to test a methodological model—that of using
metaevaluation to examine a large number of reports. The results from this attempt are
mixed. While the use of metaevaluation in this way can lead to greater insight on what
specific aspects of evaluation reports are excelling or failing, accurately and fairly
evaluating reports of this type solely from the report itself presents some major problems.
The main difficultly with metaevaluating LPE reports may lie in the nature of the
reports themselves. These reports are developed for a specific audience (state legislators).
To serve this audience LPE report authors seek to keep the report relatively brief. In
doing so much of the technical information that is often found in complex evaluation
reports is not included. This lack of information leads to necessary caveats when
conducting a metaevaluation. Table 6 (p. 93) seeks to address these caveats. Eleven of the
sixteen metaevaluation criteria used in this study are judge as yielding moderate
confidence in the grades assigned.
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A more streamlined set of metaevaluation criteria could be developed that
combines several of the high scoring areas from this study. Criteria such as clear, concise,
complete and defensible are certainly important for LPE reports but given the uniform
success of reports in meeting these criteria they could possibly be combined. A more
rigorous set of metaevaluation criteria could be applied to areas such as quality control,
values, stakeholders, and timeliness if there was more agreement in the LPE field about
what specific information should be included in reports.
Time constraints require that metaevaluations across a large number of
evaluations be conducted using solely the evaluation reports. This leads to deficiencies on
judging the quality of an evaluation on some criteria. It renders some criteria nearly
impossible to judge. However, within these restraints a credible metaevaluation can be
conducted and possibly contribute both the field of evaluation and to state government
knowledge across many issue areas
Any evaluation is limited in the scope of information used to form evaluative
conclusions. At the most basic level, no single evaluator, or team of evaluators, could
possess complete information. More practically, evaluation budgets limit the resources
available to collect and analyze information. Evaluation timelines also limit the extent
evaluators can collect and evaluate information. Time constraints are particularly
pertinent to the field of legislative program evaluation.
Metaevaluation reflects these same limits. Further limiting the basis for a
metaevaluation to the reports produced by an evaluation creates still more problems. The
key question is not are there limitations—there surely are—but do the limitations
irreparably compromise the value of the metaevaluation.
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In one sense report metaevaluations are simply evaluating the report itself and not
essentially the evaluation per se. Some of the LPE metaevaluation criteria concentrate on
solely the report—clarity, concision, timeliness. Other criteria straddle the issues of the
essential evaluation and the reporting of the evaluation—rights of human subjects,
findings and conclusions. An evaluation may competently reach findings and conclusions
but not adequately report them. Conversely, the evaluation report my present convincing
findings but lack the actual factual basis for such findings (these situations can range
from the extreme example of fraud on the part of the evaluators to more mundane
instances of errors of interpretation or errors of significance).
Metaevaluation can be a useful tool for discovering the characteristics of a general
class of evaluation reports. This study has determined that state LPE reports are very goal
oriented, rarely question the usefulness of the agencies being evaluated, conform closely
to the GAGAS, and vary greatly in their use of comparisons. The metaevaluation criteria
have aided in examining these reports and presenting these results. Metaevaluation across
a large number of reports may be best suited to, and most useful for, academic research in
specific areas, a peer review process for LPE units or other evaluation-related groups,
studying policy transfer across jurisdictions (see Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), and
committees or other groups charged with creating or revising standards of practice in
evaluation.
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Key Criteria for Metaevaluating LPE Reports

The 16 metaevaluation criteria used in this study represent only a partial list of
ideal LPE metaevaluation criteria. The addition of two criteria—metaevaluation and
cost—would create a list of 18 key criteria for evaluating LPE reports.
Metaevaluation is particularly important for any evaluative endeavor. State
legislatures commission LPE units to evaluate the work of others—work that is
accomplished via policies, programs, or agencies. The GAGAS contends that work of
performance auditors can "lead to improved government management, decision making,
and oversight" (General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 5). Consequently, a review of the
work of performance auditors and evaluators is necessary to improve performance audits
and evaluations. The PES include a standard for metaevaluation. According to the Joint
Committee metaevaluation "can help program evaluators avoid critical mistakes" (Joint
Committee, 1994, p. 185). The GAGAS includes a requirement that audit organizations
undergo external peer reviews at least once every three years (General Accounting
Office, 2003, p. 57). These peer review include reviews of individual audits. A system
that requires a metaevaluation be conducted for each audit or evaluation would greatly
improve upon this periodic peer review requirement.
The cost effectiveness of an evaluation is covered clearly by the PES. However,
the GAGAS includes no corresponding standard relating to the cost of a performance
audit (see Chapter 2, pp. 68-69). This study did not include the cost of the LPE reports as
a metaevaluation criterion due to the lack of information on costs included in the reports.
However, any complete list of metaevaluation criteria for LPE reports should include the
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costs incurred in producing each report. These costs should be measured against the
benefits produced from the LPE report. Reports that produce greater benefits through the
identification of program efficiencies, the elimination of inefficient or counterproductive
programs, or the documentation of positive or negative side-effects from programs or
policies under review would be a particularly good investment of LPE resources.
Programs or policies that expend more public resources or have a greater scope would
typically be more important to evaluate than would lower cost and more narrowly
tailored programs. However, programs or policies that are narrow in scope can often
produce large positive or negative side-effects. LPE reports that identify these programs
and their hidden effects could be particularly cost-effective.
These 18 key metaevaluation criteria, drawn from the GAGAS for performance
auditing and the PES, provide a tool for assessing the merit, worth and significance of
LPE reports. Differing subject matter and practical considerations will necessitate that not
all LPE report will be exemplary on all criteria. However, all LPE reports should
adequately address each criterion.

Directions for Further Research

This study has presented a detailed view of what state LPE units are producing in
their reports to their respective legislatures. The study has not addressed the extent to
which the legislatures actually use the reports produced for them. There has been some
recent investigation into this issue (VanLandingham, 2006) using surveys of legislators
and other stakeholders. Other approaches that may prove promising are in-depth case
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studies of specific LPE reports and their affects and documentary reviews of committee
hearings and other legislative records in the years following LPE reports.
Another aspect of LPE reports that deserves in-depth research is the treatment of
program or agency cost. This study did not directly assess the treatment of cost in its
metaevaluation criteria. However, reading the reports disclosed that while program or
agency expenditures and revenues are usually listed—sometimes extensively—-the
analysis of these costs is often non-existent or perfunctory. An entire study, replicating
this study's basic methodology of selecting a sample of LPE reports, could concentrate
solely on the treatment of costs and cost analysis within the field of legislative program
evaluation.
The use of comparisons in LPE reports could also be studied using a similar
methodology. An examination of LPE reports that include comparative analysis could
provide insight on the circumstances that contribute to the use of this important
evaluative approach. This study provides evidence that LPE report objectives are not
driving the use of comparisons in the report. A more focused review may uncover other,
more subtle signals from legislators that cause LPE units to include comparative analysis
in their reports.
Finally, the work of LPE units controlled by legislative bodies could be contrasted
with similar work conducted by LPE units controlled by a state's executive branch. This
study briefly compared the two and found only minor differences. The National
Legislative Program Evaluation Society includes member offices from both the executive
branch and the legislative branch. A comprehensive approach to studying differences
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would examine states that contain LPE units in both the executive and legislative
branches of government and compare the work of these units.

Comparisons with Previous Literature

This study adds to the list of literature cited by Funkhouser (2005) concerning
performance auditing in state governments in the United States. It also addresses the lack
of empirical work looking directly at evaluations and performance audits cited by Pollitt
and Summa (1996). This study found differences in the way LPE performance audits and
evaluations use comparisons, conform to professional standards, and identify the source
of their objectives.
The study takes a more narrow view of what constitutes legislative program
evaluation than does the NLPES. NLPES surveys and membership lists (see Mohan,
1997; NLPES, 2004, 2007; VanLandingham, Kinton, Boerner, & Zelio, 2000) include
many units that are based in a state's executive branch. This study limits LPE units to
those that are directly under the control of the legislature.
A few previous studies have examined reports generated by state LPE units.
Brown and Craft (1980) found that the state legislative audit-evaluation agency reports
they reviewed "usually consulted reports from the GAO and other states' audit agencies"
(p. 261). This study found that only 27 percent of LPE reports cited national or state
reports on the topic under review. Brown and Craft, conducting their study when fewer
state LPE units existed, analyzed reports from 15 state LPE units.
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Looking at the Illinois Auditor General's office, Brown (1988) found that 70
percent of report recommendations are directed to the agency or program under review
while 30 percent are directed to the legislature. Similarly, this study finds that 75 percent
of LPE reports contain agency/program recommendations while 43 percent contain
recommendations for the legislature.
This study follows a methodology used by several others in using metaevaluation
to examine multiple reports in a particular field. Previous examinations using this
methodology looked at evaluations of international development programs (Bollen,
Paxon, & Morishima, 2005; Chatterji, 2005; Forss & Carlsson, 1997; Kruse, 2005;
Leeuw & Cooksy, 2005), international agricultural programs (Cooksy & Caracelli, 2005),
sports policy in the Netherlands (Hoogerwerf, 1992), after school programs (Scott-Little,
Hamann, & Jurs, 2002), and criminal justice programs (Larson, et al., 1979). One
previous study (Bickman, 1997) used metaevaluation to examine all evaluations,
covering a variety of topics, published in two academic journals over a ten year period.
This study expands the previous list to include the examination of LPE reports.
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APPENDIX A
Metaevaluation Criteria
Preliminaries
Statement of Scope and Objectives
Excellent: The report lists the specific agency/department and/or activities to be
evaluated/audited. The report lists the specific objectives of the audit/evaluation and how
the objectives were determined (by legislative direction, statute, etc.).
Good: The report lists the specific agency/department and/or activities to be
evaluated/audited. The report lists the specific objectives of the audit/evaluation but not
how the objectives were determined.
Fair: The report specifies the agency/ department/activity evaluated or the specific
objectives but not both or lists nonspecific objectives (such as "operating in the public
interest").
Poor: The report fails to specify both the agency/department/activities evaluated/audited
and the objectives.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
Identification of Values
Excellent: The report clearly identifies the values used to determine the evaluative
conclusions and how these values were chosen (the source of these values).
Good: The report clearly identifies the values used to determine the evaluative
conclusions but not how these values were chosen (the source of these values).
Fair: The report implies the values used without clearly identifying them.
Poor: The report fails to address the values used.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
Quality Control
Excellent: The report clearly identifies sufficient internal quality control measures and
external peer reviews conducted of its organization.
Good: The report clearly identifies sufficient internal quality control measures but fails to
identify external peer reviews conducted of its organization.
Fair: The report identifies limited internal quality control measures and no external
organizational reviews.
Poor: The report identifies no internal quality control measures and no external
organizational reviews.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
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APPENDIX A—continued
Statement of Standards Compliance
Excellent: The report prominently states what standards (PES, GAGAS), if any, guide its
conduct (for example, if there is a methodology section, the standards followed are listed
there as well as in the introduction, summary, or letter of transmittal).
Good: The report states what standards, if any, guide its conduct but do not identify these
standards in the methodology section.
Fair: The report refers to adherence to general professional standards or "government
auditing standards" but does not specify which standards.
Poor: The report does not address standards.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
Stakeholder Identification
Excellent: The report clearly identifies stakeholders for the program/agency/policy under
review, including all of the following: consumers of the evaluand, staff working on the
evaluand, decision-makers about the evaluand and funders of the evaluand.
Good: The report clearly identifies stakeholders for the program/agency/policy under
review, including more than one but not all of the following: consumers of the evaluand,
staff working on the evaluand, decision-makers about the evaluand and funders of the
evaluand.
Fair: The report identifies limited stakeholders or identifies only an overly broad group of
stakeholders (e.g. the people to the state).
Poor: The report fails to identify any stakeholders.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
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Appendix A—continued
Methodology
Complete
Excellent: The report covers all of the areas it claims to cover in the scope and objectives
sections.
Good: The report covers all but a single small area mentioned in the scope and objectives
section.
Fair: The report covers most areas it claims to cover in the scope and objectives section.
Poor: The report fails to cover most of the areas it claims to cover in the scope and
objectives section.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
Accurate
Excellent: Agency comments are included and the agency did not dispute the accuracy of
the information reported.
Good: The agency disputed the accuracy of some information but the report convincingly
rebuts this.
Fair: The agency convincingly disputes the accuracy of some minor information in the
report.
Poor: Agency Comments convincingly dispute report's accuracy.
Not Addressed: The type of report or subject matter does not lend itself to the inclusion
of agency comments.
Defensible
Excellent: There was "sufficient, competent and relevant evidence . . . obtained to
provide a reasonable basis for the auditors' findings and conclusions."
Good: There was "sufficient, competent and relevant evidence . . . obtained to provide a
reasonable basis for the auditors' findings" but the overall conclusions go beyond the
individual findings.
Fair: There was competent and relevant information presented but the conclusions go
beyond what that evidence supports.
Poor: There was not sufficient, competent and relevant information presented to provide
a reasonable basis for the findings.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
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Appendix A—continued
Human Subjects' Rights
Excellent: There is no evidence that the report authors violated subjects rights (disclosed
confidentiality, presented negative information without opportunity for rebuttal, etc.) and
the report identifies procedures designed to ensure the rights of human subjects.
Good: There is no evidence that the report authors violated subjects rights (disclosed
confidentiality, presented negative information without opportunity for rebuttal, etc.).
Fair: There is some evidence that the report authors violated subjects rights (disclosed
confidentiality, presented negative information without opportunity for rebuttal, etc.).
Poor: There is strong evidence that the report authors violated subjects rights (disclosed
confidentiality, presented negative information without opportunity for rebuttal, etc.).
Not Addressed: The report did not include activities that could undermine the rights of
human subjects (review of previous literature, etc.)
Comparisons
Excellent: The report competently addresses evaluations/audits of similar
programs/agencies.
Good: The report refers to evaluations/audits of similar programs/agencies but doesn't
address them fully.
Fair: The report addresses similar programs/agencies but doesn't address
evaluations/audits of these programs.
Poor: The report fails to refer to evaluations/audits of similar programs/agencies.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
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Appendix A—continued
Results
Context Analysis
Excellent: The report presents the context in which the program/policy/agency exists "in
enough detail, so that its likely influences on the program can be identified."
Good: The report presents the context in which the program/policy/agency exists but does
not address the context's influences.
Fair: The context is presented in insufficient detail.
Poor: The report doesn't present, or only marginally presents, the context.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
Clear
Excellent: The report is (1) easy to read and understand, (2) technical terms,
abbreviations and acronyms are explained, and (3) the material is logically organized.
Good: The report is easy to read and understand and logically organized but technical
terms, abbreviations and acronyms are not explained.
Fair: The report is easy to read and understand but is not logically organized and
technical terms, abbreviations and acronyms are not explained.
Poor: The report is not easy to read and understand.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
Concise
Excellent: The report is only as long as is necessary to convey and support conclusions.
Repetition and extraneous detail are avoided.
Good: The report is only as long as is necessary to convey and support conclusions but
includes some repetition and extraneous detail.
Fair: The report is longer than necessary to convey and support conclusions.
Poor: The report includes extensive repetition and/or extraneous detail.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
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Appendix A—continued
Findings and Conclusions
Excellent: Findings are supported by credible evidence related to the report's objectives.
Conclusions are reported as "logical inferences from the findings" not simply a
restatement of findings.
Good: Findings are supported, but some conclusions are simply a restatement of findings.
Fair: Findings are supported, but conclusions are mostly a restatement of findings.
Poor: Findings are insufficiently supported and conclusions are mostly a restatement of
findings.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
Recommendations
Excellent: All recommendations presented are specific, measurable, and logically follow
findings and conclusions.
Good: Most recommendations presented are specific, measurable, and logically follow
findings and conclusions.
Fair: Recommendations logically follow findings and conclusions but are unspecific or
not measurable.
Poor: Recommendations do not logically follow findings and conclusions.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
Timely
Excellent: The report was completed within the requirement (if any) of the authorization.
Good: The report's time requirement was extended by the report's authorizer and the
report was completed within this extended deadline.
Fair: The report was not completed within the requirements but legitimate reasons are
given for this.
Poor: The report was not completed with the requirements with no reasonable
explanation.
Not Addressed: Not applicable to this criterion.
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List of LPE Sample Reports

159

2002
2002
2002
2005
2003
2001
2001
2004
2003
2002
2005
2003
2003

Department of Public Safety, Division of Fish and Wildlife Protection,
Aircraft Section
Department of Revenue, Division of Treasury, Treasury Revenue
Management System
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, Southeast Region
Construction, Maintenance & Operations, Select Administrative Issues
Yuma Elementary School District
Arizona Department of Commerce
Arizona Department of Education—Early Childhood Block Grant Program
Arizona Game and Fish Commission—Heritage Fund
Department of Finance & Administration Office of Child Support
Enforcement Performance Audit
An Overview of California's Enterprise Zone Hiring Credit
Water Special Districts: A Look at Governance and Public Participation
Public Employees' Retirement Association of Colorado (PERA)
Administrative Expenses, Performance Audit
Division of Central Services, Performance Audit, Department of Personnel
& Administration
Motor Carrier Regulation, Public Utilities Commission and Department of
Revenue, Performance Audit, Department of Regulatory Agencies
Energy Availability in Connecticut

Division of Legislative Audit
Division of Legislative Audit
Division of Legislative Audit
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
Division of Legislative Audit
Legislative Analyst's Office
Legislative Analyst's Office
Office of the State Auditor
Office of the State Auditor
Office of the State Auditor
Program Review and
Investigations Committee

Alaska

Alaska

Alaska
Arizona

Arizona
Arizona
Arizona

Arkansas
California
California

Colorado

Colorado

Colorado

Connecticut

2001

2005

Year

Department of Commerce, Community and Economic Development,
Board of Veterinary Examiners, Sunset Review

Report Title

Division of Legislative Audit

Name of Office

Alaska

State

LIST OF LPE SAMPLE REPORTS

Appendix B

Other

PA

PA

PA

PA
Eval
Eval

Other
PA
Sunset
Eval
PA

Other

Other

Sunset

Type

2001
2001

2002
2005
2004

2002
2001

Justification Review: Environmental Laboratory Privatization Feasible;
Cost Savings Are Uncertain
Justification Review: Financial Accountability for Public Funds Program Is
Performing Well
DJJ Health Care Services
Crime Victim Services Part II: Compensation and Assistance Services
Property Forfeitures Under State and Federal Drug Laws
Audit of the Deposit Beverage Container Program
Audit of Selected Procurement, Human Resource, and Fiscal Issues of
the Hawaii Health Systems Corporation
Review of Revolving Funds, Trust Funds, & Trust Accounts of the Office
of the Governor, Office of Lieutenant Governor, Department of
Education & Hawaii State Public Library System, & Office of Hawaiian
Affairs
A Review and Assessment of the Department of Education's
Development of Educational Standards
Idaho Department of Fish and Game: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Lands Program and Strengthen Public Participation Efforts

OPPAGA

OPPAGA

Department of Audits and
Accounts

Department of Audits and
Accounts

Department of Audits and
Accounts
Office of the Auditor

Office of the Auditor

Office of the Auditor

Office of the Auditor

Office of Performance
Evaluations

Florida

Florida

Georgia

Georgia

Georgia
Hawaii

Hawaii

Hawaii

Hawaii

Idaho

2001

2002

2005

2004

OPPAGA Report: Most Adult Protection Working Agreements Signed, But
Have Had Limited Effectiveness

OPPAGA

Florida

Year

2005

Report Title
A Medicaid Buy-in Program Would Increase Health Care Access for the
Uninsured But Also Increase State Costs

Florida

Name of Office

Office of Program Policy
Analysis and Government
Accountability (OPPAGA)

State

Appendix B—continued

Evai

PA

PA

PA

Eval
PA

Eval

Eval

Eval

Eval

Eval

Eval

Type

2001
2004
2005
2002

Department of Agriculture: Reviewing the Water Structures Program
How Including Previously Unreported Moneys Spent on K-12 Education
Affects Kansas' Rankings in Nationally Published Statistics
Department of Agriculture: A K-GOAL Audit of the Kansas Pesticide and
Fertilizer Program
Uncollected Revenues and Improper Payments Cost Kentucky Millions of
Dollars a Year
Department of Transportation and Development, Construction Division
Executive Department Grant Programs
Department of Budget and Management - Managing for Results Initiative

Legislative Division of Post
Audit

Legislative Division of Post
Audit

Legislative Division of Post
Audit

Legislative Research
Commission
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Auditor

Department of Legislative
Services

Kansas

Kansas

Kansas

Kentucky
Louisiana
Louisiana

Maryland

2004

2002

2002

2003

Local Government Reorganization: Assessing the Potential for Improving
Cooperation and Reducing Duplication

Legislative Division of Post
Audit

Kansas

Kansas

2003

2003

Financing Local Governments: Determining How to Avoid Future
Problems Caused by State Revenue Shortfalls

Legislative Division of Post
Audit

Kansas

Highway Construction Change Orders: Reviewing Costs Associated with
Construction on Highway 36 Near Marysville

2004

Register of Deeds Technology Fund: Reviewing the Amounts Collected
and the Uses of Those Moneys

Legislative Division of Post
Audit

Kansas

Legislative Division of Post
Audit

2005

Highway Construction: Reviewing KDOT's Plans for Construction on
Highway 183 South of Plainville

Legislative Division of Post
Audit

Kansas

„

2001
2003

Year

Illinois State Board of Education and Other State Agencies Providing
Funding to Illinois' Regional Offices of Education
Issues Relating to Recycling and Solid Waste Management Programs

Report Title

Auditor General
Legislative Services Agency

Name of Office

Illinois
Indiana

State

Appendix B—continued

PA

PA
PA

Other

PA

PA

PA

PA

PA

PA

PA

PA

Eval

PA

Type

2004
2004
2002
2002
2002
2001
2005
2003

2003
2002

Performance Audit - Human Resources Management Network (HRMN)
Self-Service
Performance Audit - Management Information Database
Performance and Financial Audit - Bureau of Workers' Disability
Compensation
Performance Audit - Division of HIV/AIDS - STD
Performance Audit - Fire Marshal Division
Performance Audit - West Shore Community College
Energy Conservation Improvement Program
Preserving Housing: A Best Practices Review
A Review of the Legality of the Chancery Court Order Directing Annual
Payments of Twenty Million Dollars in Perpetuity to the Partnership for
a Healthy Mississippi
A Review of the Mississippi Adequate Education Program Funding
Process
Program Evaluation: Professional Athletes and Entertainers Tax
Highway and Bridge Construction Contract Claim Process

Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Legislative Auditor
Office of the Legislative Auditor
Joint Committee on
Performance Evaluation and
Expenditure Review (PEER)
PEER Committee
Joint Committee on Legislative
Research
Legislative Audit Division

Michigan
Michigan

Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Minnesota
Minnesota

Mississippi

Mississippi

Missouri
Montana

2002
2003

2004

Performance Audit - Clean Michigan Initiative, Natural Resources
Protection Programs

Office of the Auditor General

Michigan

2005

Performance Audit - Selected Educational Databases Maintained by the
Center for Educational Performance and Information

Office of the Auditor General

Michigan

Year
2002
2005
2005

Report Title
Losing Credibility
Performance Audit - Michigan State University
Performance Audit - Office of Community Corrections

Legislative Post Audit and
Oversight Bureau
Office of the Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General

Name of Office

Massachusetts
Michigan
Michigan

State

Appendix B—continued

Eval
PA

Eval

Eval

Eval

PA
PA
PA
PA
Eval

PA
PA

PA

PA

PA
PA
PA

Type

2002

2005
2002
2003
2003
2002
2001

State Engineer - Office of State Engineer and Interstate Stream
Commission Audit Operations
No Room In The Playground: A Report Examining Playground Space in
New York City Elementary Schools
The Operating Costs of Ohio's eCommunity Schools
Audit of Oregon's Programs for Children and Families: Evaluation of Local
Coordinated Comprehensive Planning
The Status of Project Link-to-Learn and Other Educational Technology
Initiatives
Connect CARRE Performance Audit
A Review of Agency Restructuring and the Business Enterprise Program
at the South Carolina Commission for the Blind
A Review of Higher Education Performance Funding
University of Tennessee Board of Trustees
Labor and Workforce Development, Department of: Department of Labor
and Workforce Development and Related Entities

Legislative Finance Committee

Committee on Oversight,
Analysis and Investigation

Legislative Office of Education
Oversight

Legislative Fiscal Office

Legislative Budget and Finance
Committee
Auditor General

Legislative Audit Council
Legislative Audit Council

Comptroller of the Treasury,
Division of State Audit

Comptroller of the Treasury,
Division of State Audit

New Mexico

New York

Ohio

Oregon

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

South Carolina
South Carolina

Tennessee

Tennessee

2004

2005

2003

2004
2002

Department of Education, Adequate Education Grant Data
PBB Evaluation of Office of Cultural Affairs

Office of the Legislative Budget
Assistant
Legislative Finance Committee

New Hampshire
New Mexico

2002

PA

PA

PA
PA

PA

Other

Other

Eval

Other

PA

Eval

PA

PA

PA
Eva!

2003
2002

Department of Transportation, Highway Planning and Real Property
Management

Type

Year

Report Title
Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Fund
Nebraska Habitat Fund

Legislative Council Bureau

Name of Office
Legislative Audit Division
Legislative Research Division

Nevada

Montana
Nebraska

State

Appendix B—continued

State Auditor
Sunset Advisory Commission

State Auditor

Texas
Texas

Texas

West Virginia
West Virginia
West Virginia
West Virginia
West Virginia
West Virginia
West Virginia
West Virginia

Washington
Washington

Virginia

Comptroller of the Treasury,
Division of State Audit
Sunset Advisory Commission
Sunset Advisory Commission

Tennessee
Texas
Texas

Legislative Auditor General
Joint Legislative Audit Review
Commission
Joint Legislative Audit Review
Committee (JLARC)
JLARC
Legislative Performance
Evaluation and Research
Division (PERD)
PERD
PERD
PERD
PERD
PERD
PERD
PERD

Comptroller of the Treasury,
Division of State Audit

Name of Office

Tennessee

State

Appendix B—continued

2002

Special Report: The Secretarial System

Prosecuting Attorneys Institute
West Virginia Conservation Agency
Board of Risk and Insurance Management
PEIA Finance Board
Potomac River Basin
Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Board
Board of Acupuncture
Educational Broadcasting Authority

HVAC/R Licensing & Testing Requirements Study
Overview of Environmental Permitting for Transportation Projects

2004

A Review of Decision-making Process Used to Obligate Federal TANF
Surplus Funds

2005
2005
2004
2004
2003
2002
2001
2001

2005
2005

2003
2002
2001

2001
2004
2004

2004

Year

Water Quality
Barber Examiners, Texas State Board of
Pharmacy, Texas State Board of
An Audit Report on the Texas Education Agency's Administration of the
Foundation School Program
Workforce Commission, Texas
An Audit Report on Correctional Officer Staffing at the Department of
Criminal Justice

Southwest Community Services Agency

Report Title

Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other

Other
Other

Other

Other

PA

PA
Sunset

PA
Sunset
Sunset

PA

Type

Name of Office
Legislative Audit Bureau
Legislative Audit Bureau
Legislative Audit Bureau
Legislative Audit Bureau
Legislative Audit Bureau
Legislative Audit Bureau
Legislative Audit Bureau
Legislative Service Office

Note. Eval - evaluation; PA = performance audit.

State
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Appendix B—continued

SeniorCare Eligibility
State of Wisconsin Investment Board
Office of Justice Assistance
Pesticide and Fertilizer Fees
Professional Football Stadium District
Prior Authorization for Therapy and Other Services
Prison Health Care
Wyoming Aeronautics Commission

Report Title

2005
2004
2003
2003
2002
2001
2001
2002

Year

Type
Eval
Eval
Other
Other
Other
Eval
Eval
Eval

APPENDIX C
List of Non-LPE Sample Reports

167

2002
2001

Elections: Development and Implementation of Statewide Voter Checklist
System Could Be Improved
Getting There from Here: Recommendations to Modernize the Permit Process
and Improve Financial Controls at the Department of Environmental
Conservation
Vermont's Restitution System: Failing to Pay the Victim

State Auditor

State Auditor
State Auditor

Vermont

Vermont
Vermont

Note. PA = performance audit.

2005

Drivers Licensing Process
Community Alternatives Program for Disabled Adults
State Energy Policy Council and the State Energy Office
State Aircraft Operations
North Dakota Veterans' Home
Service Payments for the Elderly and Disabled (SPED)
Department of Public Safety Performance Audit

Year
2005
2004
2004
2003
2002
2001
2004

Office of the State Auditor
Office of the State Auditor
Office of the State Auditor
Office of the State Auditor
State Auditor
State Auditor
State Auditor and Inspector

Report Title

State
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Dakota
North Dakota
Oklahoma

Name of Office

List of Non-LPE Sample Reports

Appendix C

Other
Other

PA

PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA

Type

APPENDIX D
List of Louisiana LPE Sample Reports

169

Legislative Auditor

Louisiana

Note. PA = performance audit.

Name of Office
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Auditor

State
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana

2005
2004
2004
2003
2002
2002
2002
2001

Department of Economic Development, Office of Financial Institutions, A Review of the
Louisiana CAPCO Program

Year

Report Title
Louisiana Housing Finance Authority, Administration of Energy Assistance Programs
Department of Economic Development, Financial Assistance Programs
Quality Jobs Program
Louisiana Community and Technical College System
Department of Economic Development - Business Tax Incentives
Governor's Office of Women's Services
Louisiana Tax Commission Ratio Studies

LIST OF LOUISIANA LPE SAMPLE REPORTS

APPENDIX D

PA

Type
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA

